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Chapter One 
Philosophical Discussions 
 Human rights and human worth, often deriving from Immanuel Kant, are rooted 
in associating agency and freedom with the capacity to reason. If entities are limited in 
reason, it can be morally justified to deprive them of participation in the exchange of 
respect and dignity as required by universalizing maxims that necessitate ethical 
treatment. Therefore, the ability to reason is often a critical qualifier for who we 
determine to be fully human. I will explore how the neurosciences have gained the 
authority to demarcate which entities can and cannot reason, thus putting this discipline 
in a pivotal role in determining who is worthy of human rights. I will argue that 
neuroscience is not only insufficient but also incapable of demarcating rational capacity. 
To support this argument, I will elucidate how women are socially marginalized through 
neuroscientific arguments to illustrate how neuroscience, as an enterprise attributed with 
the authority to determine who is rational and who is not, is ripe for misuse by those with 
the social ability to dominate. The framework I will provide is translatable to how other 
social identities, such as people of color, queer and trans people, and those who are 
diagnosed as mentally deviant, are delineated as inferior through neuroscientific evidence. 
However, for the sake of brevity and focus, I will isolate my critique to women as a social 
identity. I will elaborate the process of how the neurosciences participate in 
marginalization by analyzing specific neuroscientific literature in the next two chapters. 
However, before I endeavor to critique neuroscience, I will lay the philosophical 
foundations through which I present my normative aim and also present the descriptive 
process that will inform the significance of this concern. 
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 First I will explore Immanuel Kant’s moral theory, which hinges on the concept of 
rationality intertwining with moral worth. For my argument, moral worth will be defined 
as the guarantee that one’s agency will not be imposed upon by another agent. With full 
moral worth, agents are granted human rights, and in essence a respect for and an 
admission of their personhood. When these qualifiers are denied, the deprived agent is 
dehumanized and can therefore fall victim to maltreatment that we would otherwise not 
impose on full moral agents. After elucidating Kant, I will describe Alan Gewirth’s 
description of human rights and his Principle of General Consistency (PGC) to lay the 
foundations for why we should subscribe to a moral maxim that respects human dignity, 
worth, agency, and freedom for all human beings. Though both Kant and Gewirth have 
rigorous mechanisms to evaluate moral worth, I argue that they have not sufficiently 
clarified the sense of human reason essential for moral worth, though I do acknowledge 
Gewirth’s account is more inclusive of variations of human reason than Kant’s. This 
provides space for a mechanism, such as neuroscience, that demarcates rationality, to 
enter the argument and therefore define who is and who is not deserving of moral worth. 
Consequently, it is also ripe for abuse by those who fit the traditional criteria of the 
rational beings to claim more human worth than those who do not.  
 Secondly, I will explore John Stuart Mill’s concept of individuality to see if 
individual variations on the expression of rationality is worth respect. This argument will 
lay the foundation for why irrelevant factors in others that do not hinder our or their 
personal agency should not enter the moral calculus. Thirdly, I will argue that the ability 
to deny those who are deemed different moral worth is due the authority those in power 
have to demarcate who is rational and who is not. In doing so they maintain that 
rationality is a qualifier of human rights, as posited by Kant, yet by modulating the 
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criteria and inappropriately demarcating who is truly rational, they are able to deny 
marginalized people human dignity. To elaborate this process, I will elucidate George 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s dialectical phenomenology of the Lord and Bondsman to 
describe the process whereby denying the right to be recognized by an ‘other’ creates a 
parasitic, paternalistic, and almost inescapable relationship whereby those in power 
become the agents that determine, reduce, and ultimately negate any sense of self in the 
‘other’. The philosophical notion of the ‘other’ has variable definitions but conceptually it 
merely stands from an entity that is not the agent of action and may be the entity that is 
acted on by an agent. In identity politics and theory, the ‘other’ is merely a marginalized 
entity. In this paper, I will use both the abstract philosophical notion of the ‘other’, simply 
as the passive agent, as well as the ‘other’ being a signifier of a marginalized entity. 
Considering this definition, ‘othering’ would be the process whereby an entity is acted on 
by a dominant entity and therefore marginalized. Hegel’s account of the Lord and 
Bondsman describes this toxic relationship that is situated in a historical and genealogical 
process of denying recognition to a marginalized entity that serves to strengthen the 
degenerative process. Therefore, to expand on Hegel, I will elucidate Michel Foucault’s 
historico-genealogical account of madness and the process of institutionalization and 
medicalization of the mad to describe how controlling and denying agency to the 
mentally deviant, i.e. those who cannot reason, historically developed in the Western 
world. I will use what Foucault has developed in his critique of psychiatry and extend the 
argument to say that the neurosciences are in some senses a modern expression of such an 
enterprise. In the following chapters, through my analysis of both historical and current 
literature, I will also show that neuroscience inherits many of the troubling attributes 
associated with domineering and ‘othering’ qualities. 
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 Finally, the normative pressure that pushes marginalization of those who are 
expressively ‘deviant’ is rooted in the drive towards normalcy as defined by the dominant 
‘non-deviant’ identity. Once I develop my critique of neuroscience and its historical 
relationship to women, I will provide an account of the idea of normalcy and its 
implications in the concepts of predictability and control in the final chapter. With this I 
will tie my critique of statistics to the normative significance that underlies what drives 
social marginalization.  
Human Rights and Moral Worth 
A normative maxim, or principle, that recommends what we ought to do 
considering what we know about the nature of things is a difficult claim to provide. The 
main concern when proposing an ethical system is accounting for both an objective 
source of authority in addition to a system through which an argument for what is the 
right thing to do can be justified. Immanuel Kant’s account of moral theory attempts 
such rigorous objectivity by providing the categorical imperative. Kant first argues that 
the only moral thing that is good in-and-of-itself is a good will. A good will must be 
determined by Moral Law motivated by duty, which is defined as “the necessity of an 
action from respect for the law.”1 Duty, for Kant, should be a pure motivating factor 
from the respect for the law and should not be complicated by self-preservation, personal 
interest, or happiness, which may raise interests that do not align with duty. In order for 
there to be a law that commands such obligation by duty it needs to be something that 
applies with absolute necessity to everyone, regardless of any particular interests they 
                                                
 
1 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 16. 
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have.2 For Kant, considering we are rational agents, we can think and act in accordance 
with how every other rational agent would. This reasoning gives rise to the categorical 
imperative, or universal command, which says: “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”3  
The rigor in investigating an a priori source to validate Kant’s moral maxim is to 
permit both objectivity as well as an undeniable and absolutely necessary normative 
source. For Kant this necessity to avoid contradiction comes from the fact that we cannot 
deny that we are rational beings. My reason for introducing this Kantian condition of 
rationality is to demonstrate the implications of such a justification. If someone is viewed 
as incapable of pure rational judgment, then they could be denied participation and the 
moral rights guaranteed to full moral agents. Though Kant only describes rationality in 
an abstract sense required by the a priori conditions of his argument, the implications of a 
purely reason based system of morality can be compromising if certain entities are argued 
to be inferior in their reasoning capacity. Kant emphasizes, for example, that young 
children would not yet possess the necessary rational capacity. However, he does not fully 
demarcate how we would know where human rational agency would be lacking. In 
essence, leaving the qualifiers for rationality undefined permits those who can argue for a 
restrictive definition of rationality to dehumanize those who do not meet the criteria. 
Therefore, though the capacity to reason can be a reliable source to provide a rigid 
maxim for moral oughts, the contingency on such an inconclusive measure creates 
ground for misuse by those deemed rationally superior. For example, Immanuel Kant 
                                                
 
2 Ibid., 24. 
3 Ibid., 37. 
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argued that both women and non-white races fell short of full rationality, and therefore 
could be denied full humanity.4 Because these moral theorists do not give a clear 
mechanism for demarcating rationality in a person, these theories could be misused to 
marginalize those deemed inferior in their capacity to reason. 
 Alan Gewirth provides a more expansive and inclusive account for human rights, 
but as I will show through my elucidation of his work, it still falls short of appropriately 
accounting for those who have been viewed as intellectually inferior. Therefore, it 
succumbs to the same limitations fighting between universal objectivity fixed by necessity, 
and accounting for the variations of human expression. Gewirth argues that all humans 
have human rights on the condition that they have the capacity of exercising them. This 
capacity is founded on purposive agency. This is the sense of having purposes that an 
agent wishes to fulfill and the ability to control his behavior in relation to the 
circumstances of his action.5 Because purposive agency requires a degree of rationality, 
for Gewirth the degree of human rights is compromised based on mental deficiency and 
the possibility of imposing harm on themselves or others.6 However, Gewirth does not 
hold a high standard for purposive agency; being able to take care of oneself is sufficient 
to be deemed a purposive agent. If you could argue that intellectual inferiority limits self-
care and purposive action, then you could deny someone moral worth by arguing for 
such incapacity. With human purposive action, in the sense of being able to direct one’s 
behavior to achieve purposes as the determining element in his moral theory, Gewirth 
                                                
 
4 Thomas E. Hill and Bernard Boxill, “Kant and Race,” in Race and Racism, ed. Bernard Boxill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 455. 
5 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), 8. 
6 Ibid., 8. 
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argues that there is a general human right to freedom and well-being to engage in such 
action without interference from other persons.7 Gewirth proposes a dialectically 
necessary method to argue that every agent must logically agree that other agents have 
human rights.8 The method for recognizing another person’s moral worth only becomes 
dialectically complete when one recognizes that any purposive agent has the same 
grounds for rights to well-being and freedom. Thus, the same justification for one’s own 
moral worth applies to all other purposive agents as well. One can challenge this notion of 
extending human rights to other purposive agents only on the pain of contradiction.9 This 
culminates in Principle of General Consistency (PGC) which demands, “Act in accord 
with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself.”10 This normative statement 
is parallel to other moral maxims such as The Golden Rule or Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. One thing to note here is that although Gewirth provides a normative 
requirement to grant every purposive agent human rights, there is still an insufficient 
account of what rationality looks like. Though he hints at a generic account of mental 
deficiency and potential of behavioral harm to oneself or another as being two indicators 
of compromised rationality, Gewirth does not argue that rationality should be mechanical 
or philosophically rigorous, and therefore leaves open the possibility for animal rights. 
This account is more inclusive than what Kant provides, however, the general ambiguity 
in defining reason leaves Gewirth’s account not fully equipped to buffer the potential for 
abuse.  
                                                
 
7 Ibid., 15-16. 
8 Ibid., 20. 
9 Ibid., 51. 
10 Ibid., 52. 
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 Even though the account for rationality is insufficient, if it is taken seriously as a 
necessary qualifier for human rights and moral worth, then the application of this 
measure needs to be done with caution. The issue is that rationality and its expressions 
might vary based on individuals, and people may still abide by ethical action even if their 
rational mechanism and behavioral expressions differ from the more abstract norm. If 
Gewirth’s conditions are to be considered, as long as the actions of others and their 
freedom is not hindered, then there should be no issue as to why another person should 
be deprived of moral worth even if their mechanism for reason is different. Yet as I will 
show in later sections exploring trends of discrimination that use neuroscientific evidence 
as a qualifiers of rationality, the ability to deny rational agency to others is an avenue to 
deprive those who mentally differ from moral worth and its associated human rights.  
The Importance of Individuality 
 Considering the potential for abuse, as well as ambiguity surrounding a criteria of 
moral worth that I have described above, perhaps another approach is needed in order to 
accommodate those who are susceptible to marginalization if they do not meet some 
generic criteria such as rationality. John Stuart Mill argues that individuality in thought 
and expressions should be respected, for it fosters genius, and permits society to progress. 
However, someone need not be a genius to see issues with popular opinion, and therefore 
their individuality and ability to vary from common thought may help society progress 
through critique. Mill develops a more inclusive approach to respecting someone’s moral 
worth than Kant and Gewirth. For Mill, individuality should be respected so long as it 
does not harm others, and therefore it allows people to express themselves as such and 
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permits human happiness.11 Mill fears, however, when faced with excessive individuality, 
social forces attempt to tame and enforce conformity by disciplining deviance through 
control.12 In this process a commonality or sense of normalcy is emphasized, and even if 
the idea of choice is entertained among individuals, it is directed towards preferring what 
is commonplace or the dominant view.13 Any aberration is chastised and demonized for it 
does not allow this hegemonizing normativity to exercise an unidirectional and 
uninterrupted control.14 The result of being labeled as different for expressing oneself as 
an individual runs the risk of being diagnosed as mentally deviant, and having one’s 
liberty and agency stripped.15 It was once tolerable to completely eradicate those who 
were non-conforming, but nowadays we are encouraged to be more ‘charitable’16 and 
place those who are different in therapy to modulate them back into normalcy. Mill is 
more focused on the social and legal restrictions on expression and action. His analysis 
aligns with the Foucauldian genealogical process of powering-over and institutionalizing 
which I will describe below.   
One distinction to make here is that Mill’s emphasis on individuality seems to 
strive from expressions that a person has choice over, instead of qualities that are not 
easily changeable, such as their sex, race, or sexual orientation. Therefore, it can come off 
as patronizing to believe someone’s variance in-and-of-itself has any merit towards 
progress. Yet, that is one form of individuality that deserves respect considering it is not a 
                                                
 
11 John S. Mill, “On Liberty: Chapter 3: Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being,” 
in Utilitarianism; On Liberty; Considerations on Representative Government; Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, ed. 
Geraint Williams (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), 124. 
12 Ibid., 128. 
13 Ibid., 129. 
14 Ibid., 133. 
15 Ibid., 137. 
16 Ibid. 
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variance that should be demonized on two accounts. Firstly, as Mill would agree, these 
characteristics do not interfere with another’s well being. Secondly, though Mill does not 
fully account for this, an individual or ‘different’ expression that is not a person’s choice 
cannot be argued to be morally superior because these qualities are not based on merit or 
any effort on behalf of the agent. Gewirth might argue that these marginalized identities 
do not compromise someone’s purposive agency. This is because people from these 
marginalized groups can lead their own lives, and their identities are not necessary 
hindrances to purposive agency. Thus, Mill would then say that even if these lives are 
different from the norm they should be respected, because it does not interfere with 
another person’s freedom. In fact, such differences should even be encouraged because it 
allows for a diversity of outlooks and insight. However, as I will elucidate below, the 
process of marginalizing individuals who bear deviant identities is an attempt to move 
them towards normalcy and predictability. This process is destructive as it negates their 
personhood holistically and reduces them to objects or mere features that can be 
modulated. The result of such a dehumanizing process is either to eradicate such groups 
or in a more modern fashion diagnose and pathologize their differences and complement 
it with therapy or embark on less ‘medical’ efforts to have individuals conform to a norm 
largely defined by the dominate group.  
Though Mill may not have considered the idea of an undecided difference, such 
as sex, race, etc., when exploring individuality and its connection to well-being, these 
differing identities succumb to the same demands of mediocrity and conformity that Mill 
articulates. However, because it is difficult to fully subordinate and modify such 
differences, deviant identities undergo a process called ‘othering’ that is a more brutal and 
totalizing marginalization than someone with a minority opinion or expression endures. 
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Someone with a minority opinion may be at liberty to be an individual and to deviate 
from majority beliefs, and they are also at liberty to relinquish any deviant beliefs if the 
pressure to conform is insistent. However, marginalized social identities such as women, 
non-white races, or homosexuals are faced with the challenge to emulate a dominant 
identity, while simultaneously being barred from the privileges or even identification with 
the dominant group no matter how convincingly they imitate a notion of normalcy. They 
are tethered to such identities either through biological restraints on their phenotype or 
rigid social consensus on their status, and thus would not be at any liberty to easily change 
their identities at will. Hegel’s account of the Lord and the Bondsman describes this 
dialectical process whereby the ‘other’ is marginalized into an inescapable objectified 
state in which the dominant agent drives a normative pressure on the ‘other’ to yearn for 
recognition from their oppressor. Elucidating this process below will lay the foundation 
for subsequent auxiliary arguments on why such a phenomenon is concerning specifically 
as it unfolds in the neurosciences.  
Producing Normative Control of the Other 
In Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel’s account of a lack of mutual recognition in the 
Lord and Bondsman relationship lays the foundations as to how certain individuals are 
marginalized and gives birth to the conceptual matrix wherefrom we can understand how 
neuroscience, as an ‘othering’ enterprise, is aligned with this problematic relationship. 
Hegel proposes that an ideal situation of mutual recognition exists when two entities are 
able to see each other as they would see themselves. The manifestation of this is his 
account of marriage in Philosophy of Right. Marriage would be a consenting relationship 
between two individuals to self-sacrifice their differences and reciprocally see oneself in 
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the other.17 Marriage therefore stands for an ethical union that creates the foundation 
from which families form. However, because of the social realities and patriarchal 
attitudes and gender roles of his time, Hegel’s account of marriage is not fully egalitarian 
between the two entities. This does not disregard the usefulness of the framework for how 
a healthy dialectic between two self-conciousnesses should manifest. Hegel recognizes 
other levels of ethical situations such as Civil Society and the State. However, the abstract 
framework of marriage constructs a scenario whereby an ethical union can occur between 
two individuals. Marriage, Civil Society, and the State, when realized correctly on earth, 
move in an intangible normative direction, called the Ethical Idea, towards which we 
should progress.18  In essence, the idea of mutual recognition allows a dialectical process 
to ensue by beginning at the personal level with individuals selflessly recognizing the 
humanity of others.  
However, while the account of marriage demonstrates an ideal state in which 
interactions between individuals should be founded to make social progress, Hegel’s 
account of the Lord and Bondsman describes an unrelenting relationship that produces 
an incapacitated and subjugated ‘other’ by denying selfless recognition and harboring a 
stagnating dialectic where a denigrating dehumanization festers. Hegel describes this 
scenario in the abstract language of self-consciousnesses interacting with each other. A 
self-consciousness simply put is an entity or state of being that is aware of itself through 
another entity’s awareness of itself. This is merely an abstract and general descriptor of 
entities that gain their necessary being and self-awareness through the awareness and 
                                                
 
17 Georg W. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. Thomas M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965), 115. 
18 Ibid., 218. 
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recognition of themselves as conscious beings mediated through other self-aware 
consciousness who are engaged in a similar process of identity formation. Additionally, a 
self-consciousness has a will and when it encounters things that do not have a will, such as 
objects, it can move the non-conscious object as it wills. Self-consciousness exists 
primarily in-and-for-itself, and any prioritization of another self-consciousness is only for 
the sake of gaining acknowledgement or recognition. In essence, there is a selfish motive 
to gain recognition from another self-consciousness and therefore it is profitable to return 
recognition to the other.19 Self-consciousnesses balance a double identity wherein each is 
independent, not needing the other to be for-itself, and dependent, demanding 
recognition from another to bolster its sense of self. In the healthy relationship, there will 
be a self-aware dual action wherein recognition is both extended and received, satisfying 
a pure Notion of recognition.20 It is necessary that each self-consciousness differs to satisfy 
an ontological duality necessitating the struggle to self-sacrificially see oneself in the other 
and negate the abstract nature of their differences through synthesis.21 When this process 
is balanced selflessly, the ideal situation of marriage is realized. I will first provide an 
exegetical description below of how the self-consciousness functions in a dialectical 
process in order to lay the foundation for the phenomenological mechanism that is 
fundamental to understanding the idea of ‘othering’, i.e. marginalization, through Hegel. 
Understanding the mechanism of the Hegelian dialectic will then give a clear account of 
where a respectful healthy relationship between individuals can bloom, as described 
                                                
 
19 Georg W. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. John N. Findlay. trans. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 111. 
20 Ibid., 112. 
21 Ibid., 114. 
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through marriage, or social marginalization can occur, as described through the Lord and 
Bondsman.  
When one self-consciousness, in this case the Lord, refuses recognizing the other 
self-consciousness, in this case the Bondsman, the dialectic is stagnated and cannot fully 
move forward. The Lord exploits the Bondsman for recognition, simultaneously 
maintaining an independent identity while not returning the favor, thus reducing the 
Bondsman to thinghood. In this reduction, the Bondsman, still being self-conscious, works 
on himself as an object through the active exploitation of the Lord. He will actively 
reduce himself to being an exploitable object for the Lord. Through this the Bondsman 
has to sacrifice his will for the sake of the Lord. This becomes concerning, because if we 
connect the idea of agency to the moral theories mentioned above with Kant and 
Gewirth, the Bondsman sacrificing his will can deny him full moral worth, and therefore 
be denied the rights of a moral agent. In this process that the Bondsman goes through, 
the Lord gains recognition from the Bondsman, who is now an exploited object, while not 
creating a complete self-dependency on the Bondsman. The Bondsman on the other 
hand gives recognition to the Lord and his intentions by negating being-for-himself and 
instead being-for the Lord by self-objectification. However, this reduction does not carry 
to the point of self-destruction because the Bondsman must exist as an exploitable ‘other’ 
for the Lord to profit on the recognition.22 This relationship demonstrates the point of 
selfish exploitation by those in power who seek to gain recognition without having to 
return it.  
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In relationships of social marginalization, the dominant identity participates in the 
same process where they gain recognition from the marginalized through the acts of 
emulation, subordination, and obedience. However, there is no obligation for the 
oppressor to return the favor and recognize the humanity of the other. If we substitute the 
Lord and Bondsman for a dominant and subjugated identity, respectively, this Hegelian 
abstract process becomes more grounded in the nuances of the marginalized lived 
experience. For example, in a world dominated by patriarchal values, women, the 
Bondsman, have been led to develop a subservient view of themselves in reference to 
men, the Lord, and masculinity. Therefore, they model their mannerisms, physical and  
social expressions in reference to men. In order to gain social recognition in a society 
hinged on ontological and normative attributes associated with men, one has to emulate 
these male-associated values. For women, these come in mainly two polar expressions. 
One way could be through objectifying themselves to please the male gaze by being 
hypersexual or appeasing to male sexual fantasies. We see this through the sexualization 
of women in media as well as heavy emphasis on physical presentation placed on women 
to wear make-up or dress femininely. On the other hand, in order for women to be taken 
seriously in male-dominated spaces they feel pressure to abandon femininity and present 
themselves in traditional male expressions such as wearing male-inspired attire, not 
wearing make-up, taking assertive stances, and overcompensating for the prejudices they 
face about intellect and competence. This is under the assumption that they may gain 
recognition and be seen as people. In this process they stop being for-themselves, and 
therefore further exploit and reduce themselves to thinghood in an attempt to gain 
recognition. No matter how much they attempt to replicate masculinity, full access to the 
benefits of manhood are never granted because the recognition from the Lord is never 
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returned. This dialectical process is substantiated through the reality of wage-gaps, gender 
disparity in positions of power, and the discrimination and harassment women face no 
matter how much they assimilate in male-dominant spaces.  
This exegesis of Hegel’s account of the Lord and Bondsman has outlined the 
process by which a power discrepancy is created between two entities and how a lack of 
mutual recognition stagnates any progress towards realizing the Ethical Ideal. If there is 
no mutual recognition, people are not able to see others in-and-of-themselves as people 
worth respecting. As a result, an unhealthy and unequal relationship forms. In essence, if 
we are not able to respect the individuality of others and instead pressure them to express 
themselves in reference to a dominant definition of normality, we deny them moral status 
and make them susceptible to abuse by denying them human rights. 
However, Hegel does not fully explicate the specific methods through which the 
Lord maintains his ignorance of what he does to the Bondsman. Therefore, an analysis of 
Michel Foucault’s critique of the historico-genealogical creation of the Other and his 
description of clinical scrutiny of the Other may indicate how ideas of biological 
determinism maintain a paternalistic power differential through use of the neurosciences. 
Hegel’s dialectical process of mutual recognition requires that the two self-consciousnesses 
be different while able to see themselves in the other and willing to sacrifice themselves, 
for the sake of the other. However, according to the stifled dialectic described in Lord and 
Bondsman scenario, the Lord need not direct any recognition to the Bondsman and see 
him as he is in-and-of-himself. The ability to reduce and objectify the Bondsman derives 
not from pure recognition, but by a reductive gaze that subjugates the Bondsman to 
morph into an exploitable thingness, as defined by the Lord. The power comes not from 
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objectively seeing the Bondsman for who he is, but instead from defining, scrutinizing, 
analyzing, and redefining the Bondsman to the subjective expectations of the Lord. 
Foucault’s Genealogical Process from The Madhouse to The Clinic 
The reason I critique neuroscience is because it is a vessel through which 
empirical authority is combined with a connection to exploring and justifying intellectual 
capability. Therefore, it becomes a tool ripe to propagate ‘othering’ and marginalizing 
ideologies with authority. In the neurosciences specifically, this comes through statements 
of pathology, intellectual inferiority, and other language that places the mental and neural 
states of marginalized groups in normative reference to a dominant group or in reference 
to those who are considered societally ‘normal.’ Though such distinction may be valid 
when comparing brain states that strongly correlate to degenerating physical states that 
compromise an individual’s agency and safety, at times the value laden comparisons 
become problematic when denigrating an ‘othered’ brain. We can better understand this 
concerning situation by looking at Michel Foucault’s historico-genealogical critique of 
how an identity is created for those diagnosed as mentally ill, e.g. labeled as intellectually 
inferior and thus deserving of being institutionalized. This critique can be adapted to 
explain how neuroscience has historically formed and has been socially modulated to 
serve ideological priorities rooted in controlling and mastering the ‘other’. Though the 
neurosciences and their predecessors have been culpable in taking part in scientific 
discrimination of marginalized groups such as non-white races, queer people, and those 
diagnosed as mentally ill, I will focus and explicate its problematic relation specifically to 
women. I believe, however, that this provides the framework of critique that can then be 
expanded to looking at other identities to see if and how they have been ‘othered’ through 
the neurosciences.  
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 In Madness and Civilization, Foucault provides an historical account of how the 
modern institution of psychiatry has been produced. Though the neurosciences are 
mostly biologically based, the interdisciplinary nature of the current health system 
incorporates empirical findings, psychiatric diagnoses, and therapeutic tactics. This 
therefore blurs the lines of where neuroscientific research is primarily focused. I will also 
demonstrate below that neuroscience, as it stands today with its normative pretensions, is 
an extended manifestation of the institutions Foucault critiques. One point to consider is 
that Foucault’s critique focuses on the development and pathologization of madness in a 
European context, and therefore I acknowledge that this may not provide a 
comprehensive critique outside the European cultural sphere. However, considering the 
effects of colonialism and the appropriation of western clinical and diagnostic techniques, 
the remnants of these ideological frameworks may still be relevant in a largely globalizing 
world.  
Madness, to the degree it is currently stigmatized, was not always an apparent 
feature of European society. Until the 16th century, the main recognizable and 
pathological ‘other’ was the leper. Once leprosy began dying out in Europe, vagabonds, 
criminals, and the insane became the excluded.23 They were driven out of society and 
some were set on Ships of Fools where they could be sent into the ends of the earth to find 
escape from their suffering in a potential holy land where they could be saved.24 The 
critique of madness came in the modes of moral satire, and it was literally demonstrated 
with the framing of madness preceding death. In this process madness though still an 
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object of criticism, was given a momentary liberation and at least a public 
acknowledgement of people’s susceptibility to being mentally ill during the Renaissance. 
During the 17th  century, madness was no longer a disturbance that could be exiled and 
kept at bay, instead it was tamed and privately separated through institutional 
confinement complimented with the guise of social benevolence through food and 
shelter.25 This paralleled an economic shift in Europe, where, in the face of 
unemployment and resource scarcity, productivity was valued to keep away idleness, 
which was associated with the start of mental disorder.26 The insane were labeled as 
animal-like monsters,27 and therefore it was justified that they be mastered, disciplined, 
and forced into  confinement to stay hidden.28 
Madness was thought to derive from an imbalance of passions as represented by 
an eruption of black bile, the humor associated with melancholy.29 This lays the 
foundation for a physical origin to madness, and an association of physiological 
imbalance to mental and behavioral inconsistencies. More specifically, the nervous system 
and its irregularities started being associated with mental dysfunctions and the loss of 
reason.30 However, as Paul Zacchias, a 17th century Italian physician notes, there is still 
logical consistency among the mad except that their reasoning only functions within a 
language that accommodates the delirious perceptions that they produce and are 
convinced by.31  Though the madman could suffice with his delusions, he was still in a 
state of unreason in relation to normative standards of morality. Thus during the 17th 
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century madness, associated with physical correlations, was reduced to non-being instead 
of a mere descriptor of another world. This non-being quality of the madman justified his 
confinement, and with it his personhood was reduced to nothing, making him ripe for 
unapologetic and brutal correction through a normative and paternalistic control 
channeled via his incarceration.32  
The historical development of madness as unreason that can be reduced to 
nothingness so that it may be corrected through confinement signifies the development of 
the psychiatric model we currently have. Though the brutality of 17th and 18th century 
mental institutions may seem outdated, current institutional practices modify its 
expression to be less of an explicit physical attack on the mad and more of a therapeutic 
practice that seeks to make the ‘deviant’ emulate the norm. In the late 18th century 
medicine, and not just behavioral corrections within madhouses, eventually became part 
of the moral dictum, and as a result clinical authority became a necessary qualifier in 
demarcating and then punishing the mad.33 This shift signified a change where the notion 
that madness is a return to the primordial fall was abandoned, and instead an individual’s 
immediate relation to those around them and their moral responsibility to contribute as a 
functional member was emphasized.34 Unfortunately, the medical and therapeutic 
relation to madness is never truly pressured with any insistence on benefiting the 
madman. Instead the claims of benevolence or humane improvements to therapeutic 
approaches serve to occlude the paternalistic, but misguided, attitude inherited in the 
practice.35 It is explicitly through the process of describing the madman as animalistic, 
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and therefore appropriate to confine and tame, that current day neuroscience gains its 
authority to inform psychiatric therapies. For example, the language of hormone 
imbalance, neural deficiency, or some other measure that indicates a lack of stasis and 
control suggests an unpredictability to the brain, and therefore this resonates in the same 
vein as uncertainties presented by a threatening animal that cannot be domesticated. We 
are therefore driven by the suggestion of ambiguity to bring forth order. I will explore in 
the chapters below how the idea of making the neural ‘other’ predictable implies the 
possibility that the ‘other’ can be reconfigured to be normal. 
With the birth of asylums in the 18th century, therapeutic interventions produced 
a guilt in the madman where he viewed himself as a vulnerable ‘other’ and as an object 
with the responsibility to reason and escape his destitute state. In this state of confinement 
permeated with the intent to correct, the madman was reduced to his visible surface and 
animality that was then observed and scrutinized clinically.36 This is a non-reciprocal 
relationship, parallel to Hegel’s Lord and Bondsman, where the ability to analyze the 
madman lies in the control of the psychiatrist through his prestigious authority to reason 
and judge.37 The asylum was the arena where judgment could be passed, and it became a 
domain demanding homogenous morality and ethical uniformity from the madman.38  In 
the doctor-patient relationship, the patient self-surrenders to the physician’s knowledge 
and alienates himself by accepting the physician’s authority, scientificness, and validity in 
everything he has to say and determine about the patient’s inferiority.39 It is this 
submission to the normative power of the physician and the weakness created in the 
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unapologetic submission into analysis that gives the physician power over the madman 
and the moral justifications to control, subsume, and ‘work’ on correcting madness.  
However, it is not only the psychiatric enterprise that is at fault in dehumanizing 
an ‘other’. The clinical practice as well is susceptible to similar processes. For example, 
Foucault provides a historical account on the formation of the clinic. He is not as critical 
or suspicious of the enterprise under scrutiny as what he provided in Madness and 
Civilization, but this may be because empirical certainty of medicine is difficult to 
challenge, especially with current beliefs that statistical valuations are absolute and 
certain. I will elaborate this issue of viewing statistics an infallible informer of certainty in 
the final chapter, as it lies at the root of why and how the sciences gain its social authority. 
The transition in attitudes towards cure happened with asking “Where does it 
hurt?” rather than “What is the matter with you?”40 The pathological nature was 
depersonalized from being a holistic person to instead an isolated set of symptomatic 
features, which were targeted as the source of disease. However, a singular symptom as 
such cannot be isolated, nor are its effects universal.41 Yet, physical features were 
systematically segregated, taxonomized, and attributed as markers of a disease. For 
example, Meckel, a physician in the Prussian Royal Academy, in 1764 described specific 
qualities to diseased brains. He wrote, “the brains of manics are light, dry, and friable 
because mania is a lively, hot, explosive disease; those of phthisis  are exhausted and 
languishing, inert, anaemic, because phthisis belongs to the general class of the 
hemorrhages.”42 This descriptive connection made with externally visible symptoms of a 
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disease to a brain state is a trend we see in modern day neurosciences as well, as I will 
explain in later sections. When the language turns from serving the individual to isolating 
only the pathological and universalizing that symptomology, the individual is treated as 
nothing more than an accident or negative element of the disease, irrelevant to its 
essence. An epidermal gaze that scrutinizes the body becomes the priority, and the 
patient is a secondary concern.43 Because the physician is not able to bridge the gap of 
differing symptoms that are modulated and contingent on each individual’s unique 
experience, there is a multiplicity of diseases that are taxonomized to account for 
variances observed.44 
 When health is viewed as a larger collective social and political concern, there is 
further deindividualization that happens. There are multiple physician’s gazes that are 
needed. As a result, medicine was professionalized in order to control for the competing 
viewpoints and reach an authoritative consensus. Foucault argues this shift happened due 
to a need to alleviate physical misery that plagues the soul, replacing the clerical role of 
the church and her domineering authority.45 Diseases in general seemed to reflect the 
historical context they occurred in. For example, fear and exhaustion rose out of the 
politically tumultuous and famine ridden Middle Ages. Sexually transmitted diseases and 
congestion peaked in a time of relaxation and plenty during the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Nervous mental diseases began to surface in a time where pleasure was brought over to 
the imagination such as in the age of theater and novels of the 18th  century.46 Carry this 
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thread over to the present, and the diseases that we see are rooted in our specific social 
concerns.  
 In the 19th century, the general bodily health was no longer a concern because 
most physically disastrous conditions were not as severe due to modernization and 
advances in medicine. Instead the priority became normality. Knowledge about organic 
structures, and how they are meant to normally function became the basis on which the 
pathological, as a deviation from the normal, could be corrected. Before the birth of the 
clinic, there was an immediate relationship between disease and cure, centered around 
the individual, before it was socially systematized.47 In the clinic, a diseased person could 
be isolated and a physician’s constant gaze could penetrate into the patient, who was just 
a hindrance to the source of pathology.48 For Foucault, medicine does not become 
clinical until it subscribes to an encyclopedic knowledge of diseases.49 The patient who 
‘benefits’ from this clinical procedure is also pressured to publicize their pathology, 
further subordinating them to a medical gaze, so that the canon and taxonomy of diseases 
may expand and others may benefit, specifically the wealthy who may therapeutically 
benefit from the medical knowledge.50 
 What makes a clinical setting unique is that it gives the doctor the institutional 
authority to gaze, decide, and intervene.51 Additionally, this drive to classify and reduce 
disease to a collection of symptoms allowed symptoms to be a signifier of the whole 
disease, i.e. the symptom became the signifier of the patient who was but an epidermal 
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capsule embodying a total pathological state. In this objectified reduction, the patient 
could, and should, be manipulated like a machine till he is normal.52 It was through 
statistical frequency and the repetitious inquiry and inscription of pathological symptoms 
in multiple patients that gave medicine its depersonalized and objective certainty.53 The 
clinical gaze moves deeper into the patient as the all consuming drive to know the full 
structure and component of a disease. It moves beyond the directly visible to expose the 
pathological secrets hidden beneath.54 In neuroscience, the penetrative nature of brain 
scans, lesion studies, neuronal staining, protein extractions, and other invasive and 
destructive processes to reduce and describe a pathological isolate is but a modern 
manifestation according to this critique.  
The Necessity of a Foucauldian Analysis of Neuroscience and its Normative Aim 
 I have demonstrated above, evidencing Madness and Civilization as well as The Birth 
of the Clinic, that the tendencies of modern day psychiatry and therapeutics is rooted in a 
continually modulating genealogy that simultaneously suppresses, dissects, scrutinizes and 
most importantly occludes its explicit intent to power over the mentally aberrant. To 
suspect that the modern day neurosciences function independently from this clinical 
inheritance or is immune to such critique due to its empirical status would be fallacious. 
Like other sciences, neuroscience is undeniably an enterprise that is pressured by social 
and historical influences. A thorough historicist analysis, especially one focused on 
currently relevant identity politics or easily distinguishable marginalized groups, can bring 
to light how neuroscience can become a tool to further marginalize in the same vein as its 
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disciplinary predecessors. This attempt hopes to explore the descriptive process by which 
the Hegelian notion of ‘othering’ occurs. I argue that neuroscience stands as a 
modulatory apparatus that facilitates the reduction of the Other into a thinghood devoid of 
recognition and ripe for pure exploitation. In-and-of-itself, neuroscience as an enterprise 
is not necessarily problematic in relation to power dynamics between social identities. 
Instead as a socially informed enterprise it is capable of misuse. Considering this, my 
main intention is to use a historico-genealogical framework, similar to Foucault’s, to 
critique at how the neurosciences have participated in demarcating the rational and 
intellectual capacity of women. 
Ultimately, through this thesis, I hope to show that human dignity prefaced by a 
requirement of rationality is concerning due to a faltering and under-described account of 
what rationality truly is. Though we have accounts, by Kant and Gewirth, that provide a 
normative necessity to extend moral worth to all rational agents and recognize human 
rights as universalizable on pain of contradiction, there is still an insufficient demarcation 
of what reason, as a necessity for moral worth, objectively looks like. Neuroscience, guised 
in empirical validity, may seem to be one of these socially approved enterprises that can 
objectively inform us on whether a person poses the capacities required for full moral 
personhood. By subscribing to the account of dialectical stagnation in the Lord and 
Bondsman relationship, and by providing a historico-genealogical account of 
neuroscience in relation to women, as a marginalized identity, I hope to show how 
neuroscience dehumanizes through an argument of defining rationality, without any 
substantial authority to do so. However, I will recognize that neuroscience does have 
social value because it provides information that may be viable in treating pathological 
effects that are not laden with social judgments. Therefore, neuroscience should be used 
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where it can be informative and socially progressive, instead of engaging in over extensive 
explanatory enterprises where it seems to do more harm than good. 
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Chapter Two 
Limitations of Neuroscience 
In this section, I will first focus on defining the scope of the neurosciences and 
then expand upon the limitations within this field. By first laying out the historical 
development, I hope to highlight that neuroscience, like any other human enterprise, is 
riddled with social biases and vested interests. Then, I will evaluate the overwhelming 
enthusiasm with which neuroscience attempts reduce lived experiences to brains states. 
Considering this, I will explore the philosophical implications of reductionist methods and 
highlight the actual limits to which such attitudes may work. Because neuroscience is 
attributed a powerful explanatory scope, there is a tendency, especially in the public eye, 
for generous arguments for its complimentary applications among disciplines and 
industries. I will analyze these trends, both historical and current, and then describe the 
implications for the integrity, scope, and more importantly the limitations of 
neuroscience. As I delve into the issues I have outlined above, I encourage the reader to 
keep in mind the concerns I have outlined in the previous section. Neuroscience, 
attributed with studying the physical substrates of mental phenomena, is by extension 
implicated in explanations of rationality. Rationality is a valued qualifier when defining 
human agency and moral worth. Therefore, evaluating whether neuroscience is 
appropriately able to inform us about rationality will be important in understanding 
where it could be misused to marginalize people.   
First, we need to recognize that neuroscience is not isolated in an ivory tower 
where scientists are pursuing the mysteries of the brain simply for the sake of knowledge. 
This is clearer when you look into factors that lead to publication bias within 
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neuroscientific literature, and the rhetorical use of technology and ways to present data 
within the scientific community itself. There are factors such as financial sources, through 
research grants and other funding, that push research in specific directions.55 
Additionally, a corporate layer overlies the scientific community and manifests itself in 
pharmaceutical companies. These institutions may pressure research, and the 
presentation of research, in favor of medications they are trying to promote.56 This may 
then compromise findings, they way those findings are publicized, and the true results of 
the efficacy of drugs. The above mentioned issues highlight many consequences that the 
neurosciences face, not only with scientific integrity, but also with social impact as well. 
One clear example that compromises the clinical sphere is where inappropriate reporting 
of drug efficacy may lead to unintended consequences.  For example, the anxiolytic 
medication Xanax has many adverse side effects including sleep disturbances, 
hallucinations, rage, irritability, and aggressive or hostile behavior.57 However, for many 
years this information was included in the Physician’s Desk Reference (PDR). Such a 
listing is not legally required as PDR is a private non-governmental publication. In 2006, 
Upjohn, a drug company, removed Xanax from the PDR while continuing to sell the 
drug.58 Many patients are not able to recognize or report the mental side-effects that 
affect one third of users during clinical trials, and therefore the problematic symptoms go 
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underreported.59 Benzodiazepines like Xanax act through GABAA receptors and act 
through midbrain dopamine neurons in both sedative and anxiolytic actions to modulate 
the mesolimbic reward system.60 Because of the sedative effects and suppression, there is a 
compensatory mechanism that overstimulates the brain. When the benzodiazepines no 
longer can control this overstimulation the result is more anxiety, panic and psychosis.61 
Gerry Shannon is a patient who was prescribed Xanax to cope with anxiety. She had 
taken 0.25mg dose to help her sleep before visiting her husband who she suspected was 
having an affair.62 She woke up early, and took another tablet on an empty stomach. 
When she arrived at her husband’s trailer and found him with Angie, the woman she 
suspected her husband was having an affair with, she got agitated, found his gun, and 
shot Angie seriously injuring her. Gerry had not had previous history of violent acts, nor 
was she abusing her Xanax medication.63 Yet, her actions were linked to the symptoms of 
the drug and her charges were reduced.64 Gerry’s story, combined with the 
underreporting and continued sales of a symptomatically dangerous drug, demonstrates 
the problems in the psycho-pharmaceutical companies where sales are prioritized rather 
than safely medicating patients. 
Though the example above indicates an issue of poorly accounting for the social 
consequences of drug consumption, the extended consequence of the improper 
explanatory tendencies of neuroscience as a field, and how the public consumes it, is that 
certain people from marginalized communities may suffer as a result. One powerful way 
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to negate the personhood of a marginalized group is to naturalize their differences, or 
give a scientific certainty to their inferiority. Neuroscience, or any study associated with 
the mind, can do this by attributing intellectual inferiority. I will develop whether this is 
true in the history of the neurosciences and the current literature in the next section with 
a focus on sexism. However, in this section, I hope to lay the foundations on why we 
should scrutinize the neuroscientific enterprise. I will demonstrate the limitations of 
neuroscience in what it can actually inform about rationality (though this may not be its 
primary goal) and more importantly outline the avenues through which such a socially 
impactful discipline can do more damage than good at times. 
What Is Neuroscience? 
In order to understand the issue here, we need to explore what neuroscience is, 
the boundaries of what it hopes to explore, its historical nature, and its current state of 
affairs. By connecting these points on analysis, we can better understand where to 
specifically target productive criticisms. To begin, neuroscience is a multi- and 
interdisciplinary science that attempts to find the biological basis of animal behavior. It 
has a long history with roots in anatomy, physiology, medicine, and more strongly in the 
meeting of biology and psychology.65 Therefore, due to its varied influences and its 
attempts to influence other disciplines, the definition stays ambiguous, though it is mostly 
centered around the scientific study of the brain and its behavioral and mental 
implications.66  
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Prior to the 20th century, most neuroscientific research was conducted using 
neuroanatomical analyses and electrophysiology. Neuroanatomy is the study of the 
physical symmetry, density, and distribution of tissue across the brain using cell staining 
methods. Electrophysiology is studying the electrical properties of cells by measuring the 
voltage changes as ions move across the cellular membrane.  At the beginning of the 20th 
century, with the findings of Santiago Ramón y Cajal and the rise of the neuron 
doctrine,67 there was a shift towards a more molecular biology focus and away from 
neuroanatomy and electrophysiology. In molecular biology, there was focus on protein 
expression and the effects of other organic molecules within a cellular matrix on the 
behavior of the cell. To circumvent this reductionist shift, a more global perspective was 
needed. With the rise of brain imaging in the 1980s, one could study pathways and 
anatomical regions correlated with larger conceptual frameworks such as sensation, 
perception, and memory.68 Though this helped tighten the influence of both biological 
and psychological frameworks into the progress of neuroscience, the limitations of 
reductionist attitudes, technology, methodological barriers, and over-claim correlating 
biological and psychological states was left unaddressed.  
Essentially, the interdisciplinary nature and the trend to incorporate different 
methodologies to study the brain ran rampant, and with it the arguments for what 
neuroscience could inform, not only about the brain but also about ethics, sociology, 
anthropology, economics, law. These are just a few of the disciplines where the 
ontological significance of findings and the compatibility of the disciplines are left 
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unaddressed. This is currently where neuroscience lies. It has reached a point where it has 
bridged, unchallenged for the most part, into various disciplines. This is led by the 
assumption that neuroscience’s power to ‘unravel the mind’, and by extension all of lived 
human experiences, makes it appropriate to reach into either explaining what was 
traditionally the domain of other disciplines, or incorporating those disciplines in some 
way to inform us more about the mind. At times this may be useful, but the ambiguous 
nature and agglomerate history of the neurosciences may be the reason why it tends 
toward the interdisciplinary. I will address these issues in the sections below by 
elaborating on the limitations of neuroscience, and the significance of over-claiming its 
potential when extending its influence into other arenas of study and systems that have 
the potential to affect people’s view of themselves and others.  
Neuro-reductionism 
Reductionist attitudes to create a unified ‘theory of everything’69 are rampant in 
many empirical studies, especially physics, and are some one of the grandest challenges in 
philosophy facing issues of intelligibility, informativeness, and logical barriers of 
circularity with a theory having to explain itself. This challenge is rooted in the argument 
of Ockham’s razor, which proposes that the shortest explanation for something is the 
most appropriate one.70 Neuroscience attempts to do the same, but the issue is when such 
an enterprise would attempt to reduce personhood to neurological manifestations. The 
assumption here is that because the brain integrates external experience and acts upon it 
by stimulating our body, understanding the mechanism can reduce the experience to the 
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most concise and empirically valid, therefore less ambiguous, description of it. This is a 
much more difficult task than unifying the expression of fundamental physical elements, 
as personhood is a much more complex concept that carries with it social and historical 
factors along with a biological or psychological state. 
This reductionist attitude, and its practical implications, are highlighted in the 
field of psychiatry where  methodological, ontological, and epistemological neuro-
reductionism leads to conceptual issues in framing treatment.71 An example of 
methodological reductionism is exemplified when we expect animal and simple biological 
models to explain complex psychological processes in humans. Though there are 
appropriate uses for animal models in isolated frameworks, for example when inter-
organismal analysis of identical protein expression within a very specific type of cell, the 
global expression and effects of experiments are not always consistent across species due 
to both quantitative and qualitative differences.72 For example, a yeast model to study 
alpha-synuclein protein malfunction as it relates to Parkinson’s disease pathology may 
give useful insight about dysfunction at a cellular level. However, a human model is 
needed to study the cognitive and larger behavioral implications due to the emergent 
effects of such a diseased state that go beyond cellular malfunction. A mammalian model 
may be a step closer, however there are limitations in studying higher level cognitive 
functions that may only be possible through human studies. Therefore, a methodological 
reduction fails to fully incorporate complex dynamics in a system by instead focusing on 
parts, and therefore overlooks larger biological or psychological features. Ontological 
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reductionism attempts to reduce mental activity to the physical states in the brain. The 
reason this becomes an issue is because it begs the extrapolated assumption that 
recreating specific physical states in the brain should elicit related mental states. Though 
there are attempts to find specific biological markers to psychiatric disorders, the 
variability in brain states for similar behavioral output, for instance in schizophrenia, 
suggests such reductionist attitudes may not be valid.73 What ontological reductionism 
leads to is potentially eliminative materialism, which argues that eventually with enough 
knowledge about the neural and biological processes, we will not need to discuss mental 
and other emergent properties in higher order language.74  
Epistemological reductionism compliments the methodological and ontological 
reductionist attitudes to argue that all that can be known about higher order mechanisms 
can be known by our knowledge of lower order functions i.e. a certain brain pattern says 
that the person feels pain, instead of the subject themselves confirming that ‘I feel pain’. 
Thus, if the representation of a neural state is taken as face-value to be the concept of 
pain or another emergent emotion there is a conflation and epistemic jump made 
misrepresenting the idea of pain to be set of neurons firing instead of the qualia 
experience of pain itself. Though not every neuroscientific enterprise may be culpable of 
reductionist attitudes, tendencies of such approaches disregards the current lack of 
consensus on how neural states are linked both mentally and behaviorally. Additionally, 
even if the scientist is aware of the limitations of their extrapolations or what they can 
conclude from their studies, when translating complex concepts to in layman’s terms 
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there may be a susceptibility to misinform the public with rhetoric laced with eagerness to 
reduce and explain anything and everything from fragmentary findings. Therefore, siding 
with a reduced neurological explanation may negate other elements such as social 
climate, personal views, and other factors relevant to providing appropriate treatment.  
By not thoroughly accounting for discussions of how different factors play into 
personhood, neuroscience and its reductionist tendencies not only ignore these 
concerns,75 but are also culpable, as a product of society, for perpetuating social ills by 
overextending its explanatory claims. For example, in the field of psychiatry, it is not just 
the neurological state of the patient that creates the disorder, instead it is the interaction 
of interpersonal interactions, familial and group dynamics, combined with an individual’s 
psychological and biological state that modulates the psychiatric state. Therefore, 
implying a reductionist attitude that only focuses on the neurobiological state negates the 
social and psychological complexity of a mental state and undermines the multi-faceted 
therapeutic potentials.76 Sociologists, design theorists, theologians, scientists, and even 
philosophers are at fault for believing that their pursuit of knowledge can explain almost 
everything that there is. The benefit of providing theories is that we can interpret 
information to our convenience until it fits our desired worldview. Neuroscience does the 
same when it attempts to provide a scientific solution to explaining humanity. But 
considering the large social weight neuroscientific claims can have, it is particularly in this 
enthusiasm to reduce that problems arise.77 
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Neuro-hype 
One of the main sources for contention as to where neuroscience stands within its 
potential to explain personhood or humanity is around the issue of neuro-hype.78 Neuro-
hype is the phenomenon that insulates and perpetuates the explanatory power of 
neuroscientific findings to take it beyond what can arguably be said from an empirical 
finding. This leads to exaggerated and sensationalist claims of what neuroscience can do, 
due to the cultural expectations we place on the brain to not only explain ‘what we do’, 
but also to provide normative direction for ‘what we should do’.  
 The interdisciplinary nature of the neurosciences extending its reach, some would 
argue to an inappropriate degree, into other disciplines may be where these issues can be 
brought to light. Interdisciplinary enterprises at times fail to acknowledge the 
epistemological and ontological contentions that arise in integrating conceptual 
frameworks,79 even if its intentions are to gain useful insight and methodological 
approaches between different disciplines. Neuroscience has expanded into integrating 
various fields such as medicine, law, engineering, politics, economics, computer science, 
philosophy, sociology, and anthropology, to name a few of the multitude of ‘neuro-’ 
related disciplines that have surfaced recently.80 
Complimenting this interdisciplinary trend is the cultural impact neuroscientific 
explanations seem to have in being able to explain next-to-almost everything. 
Popularization of neuroscience has led to simplistic accounts of findings and its real-life 
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implications. The impact of such misinformation is further perpetuated by the media, and 
its readiness to consume the explanatory comfort of the ‘your brain made you do it’ 
claims.81 The novelty of neuroscience, especially in its unexplored potential to explain 
within medicine, science, and technology, has powerful social weight and authority.82 The 
appeal of the new, the modern, and the ‘hip’ in neuroscience is founded in the belief that 
all social phenomena and realities of the human experience can be understood.83 
Neuroscience is not new in this respect; it is part of a continued trend of empirical 
inquiries that propose that understanding the mechanisms underlying humanity can tell 
us about human nature at large.84 
However, it’s not just the sensationalist claims made by the popularizers of science 
that are at fault. Starting from the laboratory the foundations of ambiguity and 
uncertainty are constructed through methodological limitations from experimental 
procedure, frameworks that don’t fully encapsulate the full nature or sufficient 
understanding of what is being studied, and the limitations of technology. For example, a 
colorful image of a positron emission tomography (PET) scan, and the way certain voxels 
in an image are calibrated, can communicate much larger significance than the numbers 
would suggest.85 The ability to localize and point to a part of the brain and say ‘that is 
why I do what I do!’, may be helpful in articulating an otherwise indescribable 
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phenomenon. It may also benefit a rhetoric of validity when communicating to a larger 
public, but this simplistic claim does not account for the methodological uncertainties that 
preceded the creation of such an image. We have to realize that the final product, no 
matter how aesthetically convincing, is still a two-dimensional representation. Thus we 
have to be cautious when extrapolating the implication of such a blob superimposed on 
the structure of a brain. However, the communication of easily noticeable ‘difference’, 
and by extension significance, within an image makes it an easy tool to help hype-up what 
neuroscience tells us. The attractiveness of neuroscience is not only rooted in our cultural 
expectations that the brain can explain things, but it is also accentuated by the air of 
‘scientificness’ the presentation of neurological findings provides. Neuro-hype is generated 
when this fine balance of scientific digestibility and the semblance of empirical accuracy 
meets. 
Sampling Issues 
One of the major epistemological barriers in knowing the significance of a 
neuroscientific finding lies in the distance created through indirect measurements of 
neural matter. From the framing of the experimental concepts to the publication of 
results, there are a lot of uncertainties that plague neuroscientific inquiry. These concerns 
stem from limitations of conceptual frameworks, indirectness of testing methods, and 
finally rhetorical biases in data presentation. Therefore, I will explicate how at each step, 
from experimental design, to measuring brain activity, to comparing data, and finally to 
producing results, there are limitations as to what can be said for a given set of findings.  
The first step before conducting an experiment comes with the selection of 
participants. In the empirical sciences, this requires demarcating who falls under the 
experimental and control condition. To do a brain scan, a ‘normal’ brain must be 
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determined for the experimental brain to be calibrated in reference to. But this definition 
can vary depending on what condition is being studied, and whether or not other 
uncontrolled factors may be a confound to the degree of normalcy.86 Additionally, small 
sample sizes, generally 4 to 20 subjects, are used due to the cost of running such 
experiments and availability of participants. To circumvent this problem, factors such as 
race are removed by using only white participants, further limiting the extrapolatory 
potential of findings.87 For example, simple labels such as ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘normal’ 
occludes the fact that in a group of only right-handed white male participants in a certain 
age range, a non-white left-handed female participant's brain may look ‘abnormal’ as 
well.88 Therefore, it might not be solely the ‘schizophrenic’ brain that looks different 
under those conditions, but any brain would be different if it was not in the range of traits 
attributed to the control or ‘normal’ subject. 
When comparing data, the differences measured would suggest a region of 
activity, and therefore a place of significance when relating the experimental and control 
conditions. However, this aim for difference assumes that if a region is not activated, it is 
not involved in the neural process.89 Thus, this subtractive approach and the ambiguous 
use of words like significance and difference, may yield misleading interpretations of a 
study by those outside the realm of experts.90 The ability to normalize and then generate 
a comparative analysis from observed differences between a control and experimental 
brain needs to be carefully scrutinized before we give any enthusiastic interpretation of 
the findings.  
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Once results are taken from the ‘normal’ and the ‘abnormal’ brain, they are 
averaged to do comparative analyses. In each group, the brain sets are normalized to 
each other, and an average group voxel is determined, to map a brain atlas showing an 
“average group brainset.”91 Comparing the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ brain sets, via a 
subtractive method, would suggest the difference between these averaged voxels are 
essentially the difference between the groups. This ignores individual variability that 
might be of greater interest. When averaging is done before subtraction, the ‘diseased’ 
brain is averaged together, and then the differences between them are filtered out, then 
the same is done with a group of ‘normal’ brains. The resultant brain set would be the 
‘super-abnormal;’ and the ‘super-normal’ brain. These extreme brain sets are subtracted 
from each other, and the difference incurred is interpreted as the significance between the 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ though they were taken from the initial differences within those 
sets themselves.92 What difference is found through such a method is attributed to the 
areas involved in forming the ‘abnormal’ state. 
Not only does this inappropriate extrapolation of significance from arithmetic 
difference by varied methods of averaging and subtraction happen at the level of 
individual experiments, but such information is also stored in databases of “human brain 
anatomy and function.”93 For example, The Human Brain Project was set-up with such a 
project in mind, with funding for BrainMap and the Probabilistic Atlas. The BrainMap 
integrates information from various studies that can be referred to for identifying 
anatomical locations, while the Probabilistic Atlas is used to reference brains without 
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medical conditions across handedness, age, and gender among different populations.94 
Averaging, subtraction, and creating cross-referenceable databases remove individual 
variations, emphasizing similarities, and treating differences between a group as 
irrelevant.95 The issue with such an approach is it assumes that these differences must be 
significant to the treatment or variable being explored. It negates the complex ways the 
brain functions whereby the same region may be involved in a varying number of 
behaviors.  
Visualizing Differences and Exaggerating 
Once voxels are averaged and subtracted the statistically significant differences 
need to be made visible. This is done by assigning a number to a shade of gray within a 
PET image: for example, 0 for black and 100 for white. However, when it may not be 
possible or be preferred to show varying shades of gray, a process called ‘windowing’ is 
applied whereby 0-10 would be black, 11-20 a dark gray, and so on. There are limitations 
if a majority of the variation occurs in a small range of 51-60 for example. This would be 
controlled for by adding gray variation to the smaller bands of 51-52, 53-54, and so on, 
while keeping the ranges of 0-50 black, and 61-100 white. For presentation purposes, 
windowing and color coding ranges of variation help the differences stand out. However, 
this overemphasizes the difference and may negate the overall similarity between two 
images.  
To ease this issue, color may be used in the ranges where a majority of the 
variation occurs to make subtle differences visible. A sub-range can be set up as 1-20 is 
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black, 21-40 is red, 41-60 is blue, 61-80 is green, and 81-100 is yellow. Depending on 
how each sub-range is colored, the same brain-set can look very different. Additionally, 
demarcating the place where a new color begins creates sharp boundaries instead of 
showing the more diffuse nature of change from one state to another. Unlike a heated-
object color scale, the color-order used in PET image presentations are pseudo-colors that 
may not indicate whether transitioning from one color, such as from blue to yellow, may 
mean more intensity or difference.96 Between labs, there may be preferred color schemes, 
emphasizing the lack of standardization to indicate where the variation is deemed 
significant, thus leaving it to the discretion and intention of the researcher to determine 
what they would like to emphasize.97 Brian Murphy, a PET clinical physicist in the 
Department of Nuclear Medicine at State University of New York at Buffalo used copper 
plate 4 color scheme images on the same brain set to show that the same brain can be 
shown as normal, having a tumor, or indicating a stroke simply by using a different color 
scale.98 
The tension is more apparent when significance is considered within the limits of 
an image and what is signifies, compared to a picture of differences at large. Though a 
difference may be visually presented or actually be a statistically different expression on a 
brain scan, there may not be any behaviorally significant consequence. However, 
publication of images that seem contrasting or visually suggest major difference can lead 
to misinterpretation about what the differences actually suggest due to the allure of the 
imagery. This can lead to issues where imaging technology is used to provide skewed 
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accounts of the world at large. An expert may be able to contextualize the significance 
indicated in a study, but its more problematic when such information travels to the 
public. For example, a researcher may calibrate a brain image in order to show contrast 
between an experimental and control subject to clarify points of interest. However, if the 
image is taken out of context, the contrasts may be misleading. 
The varying types of rhetoric used to describe McCann et al.’s research on 
MDMA users brings to light this issue. The study compared PET scans of 14 heavy 
MDMA users to 15 non-users. The authors’ conclusion was, “these data suggest that 
human MDMA users are susceptible to MDMA-induced brain 5-HT neural injury ... 
Our data do not allow conclusions about reversibility or permanence of MDMA-induced 
changes in brain 5-HT transporter.”99 The brain images show the MDMA and non-user 
brains as heavily contrasted especially suggesting a deficiency in the MDMA brains. 
Robert Mathias, a staff writer for the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), in the 
caption of the image suggested causality by writing, “Dark areas in the MDMA user's 
brain show damage due to chronic MDMA use.”100 When presented to the US Senate 
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the director of NIDA, Alan I. Leshner, 
testified, “Through the use of positron emission technology (PET), we can actually see 
that the brain images on top belongs to an individual who has never used MDMA… 
Clearly the brain of the MDMA user on the bottom has been significantly altered.”101 
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This stands counter to what the authors of the paper initially argued in terms of 
“reversibility or permanence”. The researchers never said such generous extrapolations 
could be taken or that ecstasy left unchangeable damage to the brain. However, the 
rhetoric of the contrasted brain states was powerful enough. In fact, the image was further 
altered with an artistically inverted and even more stunningly contrasted image in the 
“your brain on drugs” campaign propelled by the NIDA with full support from the US 
government. As a result, a movement began to control MDMA using faulty arguments 
taken from a rhetorically powerful publication of the study. Though this is not specifically 
the result of the authors falsifying their data or making egregious claims, they still created 
the potential for misuse through the visual rhetoric when presenting their data.  
 The study above, its initial evidence, and the exaggerated claims that ensued 
should indicate the power images and associated words, especially about brains, can have 
on the psyche of the public. Even though the authors acknowledged the limitations of 
their study, the control they have on media consumption and sensationalist consequences 
and even what can be done in public policy, such as with the NIDA, is limited. Even 
then, when it comes time to publish, at times for the purposes of making a point, scientists 
may tend to use extreme images and words.  
Kuhn et al. (1982) admitted that in their experiment studying the effects of aging 
on the brain, the two comparative images they used were chosen because they were “the 
extremes of [the] ratio.”102 Dumit interviewed Phelps, one of the authors of the article, 
who admitted, “See we take the extreme cases for the readers to be able to see them. You 
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have the tabulated data to look at all cases. It is fine.”103 No, it is not fine. As exemplified 
by the consequences following the brain on ecstasy evidence used in the rhetoric by the 
NIDA, the public does not have the expertise, or for that matter the patience, to delve 
through the statistics to critically evaluate a study. Richard Haier admits that though 
research conclusions are based on statistics, “Most of the time, although not all the time, 
we include a color picture, because journals like color pictures, everybody likes color 
pictures- and that is what they remember.”104 For the lay-person, as Phelps and Hair 
admit, the contrasting, direct, simplified, and colorful images are what will communicate 
what they should know or even care about when looking at a brain study.   
 The benefit of producing such extreme images is not simply for the sake of making 
research findings digestible. There is usually a monetary benefit to be gained as well. 
Science unfortunately does not function in an ivory tower where researchers pursue their 
interests independent of practical concerns or consequences. Pharmaceutical companies, 
the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute of Health are just a few 
agents that provide grants and regulate the scope and direction of research that scientists 
pursue. Dumit cites a researcher at a pharmaceutical company who admits “...we found 
that most of our pharmaceutical contracts really came through the PR departments, the 
advertising departments, not through the science departments. And they were after pretty 
pictures to put in the ads, which apparently worked, and worked well.”105 There are a lot 
of issues that can be delved into critiquing neuroscience and medicine on this point alone. 
However, I will do this more substantially in a later section on how capitalistic tendencies 
                                                
 
103  Dumit, “Brain Images,” 219. 
104 Joseph Dumit, “Twenty-First-Century PET: Looking for Mind and Morality through the Eye of 
Technology,” in Technoscientific Imaginaries: Conversations, Profiles, and Memoirs, ed. George E. Marcus (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 105. 
105 Dumit, “Brain Images,” 220. 
 47 
in the sciences benefit from demarcating the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ through neuro-
hyped rhetoric that is rooted in a push to medicalize a public that strives for ‘normality’. 
We see that the researcher’s confession above highlights one of the sources which places 
pressure to submit attractive images in order to strongly communicate a certain message 
which may consciously or unconsciously have affected the author’s choice of rhetoric. 
This may go beyond what is scientifically valid and then overshadow the limitations 
indicated by the more formidable, though arithmetically dull statistics.  
So far I have described how beginning from the selection of participants, to testing 
methods, to publication, to consumption, neuroscience is riddled with problems that 
prevent it from living up to the explanatory authority it is conferred with. The main issue 
I hoped to highlight was the concern around seeking difference and going to great lengths 
to ensure that people are convinced that such differences exist. Additionally, I hope to 
indicate that differences that are being sought and communicated are influenced by the 
social agendas of scientists and their funders. I am not denying that there are going to be 
different brain states that manifest in the varied anatomical and behavioral phenotype 
between two brain samples from different groups. However, a maintained effort to look 
for difference, where that difference may not be relevant or not as extreme as one might 
expect, can lead to a poor empirical enterprise. There seems to be an underlying 
assumption that if no difference is found in a study, or if the presentation of information is 
not ‘significant’, eye-catching, or enlightening, then there must be an issue or the study 
was incorrect, not worthwhile, or good enough. This aim for difference is not only present 
in the experimental and publication procedure in the neurosciences, but also drives 
decisions about what is left unpublished and unsaid as well.  
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Publication Bias 
In the scientific community, the drive to publish studies that find significance can 
lead to a shift in the arguments made in the literature at large. Therefore, a shift in a 
biased attitude that looks at differences may result in meta analysis suggesting that certain 
findings are more important than they may actually turn out to be. This issue then 
manifests itself in publication bias. One type of publication bias familiar in the empirical 
sciences is the case of the file-drawer study, where studies are left incomplete or are not 
published because no-significant or hypothesis confirming results are found. However, 
there are many other ways the integrity of scientific literature can be compromised, and I 
will outline them below. Publication bias is a concern not only where it may be a threat to 
clinical practice and practical applications. Neuroscientific research that explores social 
identities such as gender, sexual orientation, and race may be compromised by biases 
looking for difference-reaffirming stereotypes and giving opportunity to further 
marginalize groups. Though the analyses on the current state of publication bias outlined 
below looks at medical publications at large, I would argue neuroscience as well is 
susceptible to such issues because neuroscience is an empirical enterprise closely tied with 
clinical enquiry. 
With the pressure to find difference there is a tendency for grey literature, i.e. 
research that is not-conclusive or does not agree with a widely held hypothesis, to go 
unpublished. The Health Technology Assessment (HTA) program as part of an initiative 
of The National Institute of Health Research looked into whether or not these tendencies 
affect the current state of literature in medicine. They analyzed literature from 
MEDLINE, EMBASE, AMED, CINAHL, PubMed, PsycINFO and Open SIGLE. In 
the first part, they classified studies either as evidence or method and separated them 
 49 
according to the types of dissemination bias or methods to deal with it.106 In the second 
part 200 review articles were randomly selected from MEDLINE and their methods to 
confront biases were assessed as well.  
In general, what the authors of this paper found was that studies with positive, 
hypothesis-confirming, instead of negative results were more likely to be published. As a 
result, when such papers were aggregated into review articles, a condensed publication of 
all relevant literature in a topic, the result was that such reviews were biased as well. 
Research with significant results were published earlier than those with non-significant 
results, and these earlier papers also suggested greater treatment effect as well, further 
biasing the literature. These biases can generally be controlled through locating 
unpublished studies, funnel plots analyses, sensitivity analysis modelling, and 
confirmatory large scale trials. Unfortunately, these precautionary methods are not fully 
able to account for contradictory research that may not be easily accessible, and more 
powerful analysis methods may need to be applied or devised to detect and control for 
such biases. Even then, it may be too late to retract literature before it can bias the 
general attitudes both in the sciences and in the public view in terms of policy and the 
capabilities of science. 
The researchers found evidence of various types of bias affecting the literature. 
Outcome reporting bias is when there is incomplete reporting due to reporters only 
showing some of the outcomes measured to get statistical significance.107 Chan et al. 
recorded reported and unreported outcomes on approved protocols by the Canadian 
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Institute of Health Research from 1990 to 1998, and did a meta analysis to see the 
completeness of outcome reporting within the study. They found that of the 48 published, 
only 22 trials provided information about the statistical significance of unreported 
cases.108 Many other cohorts analyzed in the HTA study found similar results showing 
exclusion of trial studies before publication.  
Time lag bias is when the direction and strength of results determine how quickly 
something is published. Reasons for this include time to develop a proposal, ethics 
committee approval, funding, participant recruitment time, follow-up with participants, 
submission to journals, and peer-review time.109 One of the cohorts in this analysis 
included a survey of 218 studies by Stern and Simes approved by a hospital Ethics 
Committee in Australia. They found that the median time for granting ethical approval 
was 4.8 years versus 8.0 years for studies with significant vs. null findings respectively (HR 
2.32; 95% CI: 1.47 to 3.66). Four of the five cohort studies on time lag bias did not find a 
significant association for time to publication and study results, but this may be due to a 
small and diverse sample size. For the six studies of time from abstract presentation to full 
publication, three of the studies found significant time lag bias. With this, the authors 
conclude that studies with significant results are generally published before studies with 
nonsignificant findings.110 The reason this is an issue is that it could put pressure on 
researchers to publish only significant results so as not to compromise the potential for 
funding and financial growth necessary to maintain their labs. Knowing that there may 
be delayed support from publication and approval committees could result in non-
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significant findings being unpublished or delayed in publication. One of the consequences 
could be that a false positive may be published earlier, and may affect a policy that may 
then have to be retracted once the delayed null results show that such claims made by an 
earlier paper may not be as conclusive as once presumed.  
Grey literature may be published or unpublished research which includes material 
that is not controlled by commercial publishers, including brochures, conference 
abstracts, ongoing research, dissertations, etc. The authors ran multiple meta-analyses 
and reviewed case studies on gray literature to find indications of bias.111 They found that 
the most common form of unpublished literature comes from conference abstracts. Grey 
literature effect in meta-analysis is generally small, there are occasions in which its 
presence or absence could introduce bias. Therefore, it is still a concern when evaluating 
effects of unpublished or generally uncontrolled work on the scientific climate.112 
Citation bias is when the study’s result is associated with the probability that it will 
be cited. In one of the cohorts, Chapman et al. analyzed citation frequency of studies of 
smoking among schizophrenia patients.113 They found a 10% increase in smoking 
prevalence was associated with 61% increase in citations. Niemien et al. (2007) looked at 
368 papers in psychiatric journals and found that the ratio of citation was 1.63 for studies 
with significant results, and found that citation rate was related to p-value.114 By analyzing 
the various cohorts evaluating citation bias, the authors found that generally positive 
results were associated with higher frequency of citation. In the sciences, the integrity of a 
                                                
 
111 Ibid., 26. 
112 Ibid., 27. 
113 Simon Chapman, Mark Ragg, and Kevin McGeechan, “Citation Bias in Reported Smoking Prevalence 
in People with Schizophrenia,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 43, no. 3 (2009): 278. 
114 Pentti Nieminen et al., “Statistically Significant Papers in Psychiatry Were Cited More Often than 
Others,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 60, no. 9 (2007): 942. 
 52 
journal and a laboratory is associated with the number of citations it gets. If there is a self-
perpetuating cycle where those with more citations rising to the top of a database search, 
further research could be skewed toward a certain topic and undermine contradictory 
results could be undermined. 
Duplicate publications are when similar articles or data are submitted to more 
than one journal.115 An estimated 10-25% of biomedical publications are redundancies 
sharing similar hypotheses, methods, results, or discussion. These may be covert,  without 
reference to parallel literature, or overt, with proper referencing to original reports.116 
Easterbrook et al. (1991), found that studies with significant results, in contrast to non-
significant results, were more likely to have multiple publications and show up in ‘high 
citation impact factor’ journals.117 Additionally, the muddled nature of poor citations and 
repetition of information was admitted by Huston and Moher (1996), who had difficulty 
finding single centers of multicenter trials of risperidone for schizophrenia, because of 
poor transparency and citations of abstracts and unpublished reports.118 They found a 
North American trial for risperidone had been cited in six publications using different 
author names and had been cited in many unpublished forms.119  
Data indexing bias is when there is a biased indexing of studies in literature 
databases. Some databases such as MEDLINE and EMBASE may not index all studies 
on a particular topic. Zielienski (1995) estimates that 98% of indexed journals are from 
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developed western countries.120 Nieminen and Isohanni (1999) found a bias against 
Finnish journals where 27% of psychiatric research published in English was not indexed 
in MEDLINE.121 
There are various recommended methods for reducing publication bias. These 
include literature searching to identify all the studies relevant to a specific review 
question, locating unpublished trials through careful internet searches, assessing the risk 
of bias such as by identifying if all trials are funded by a single entity, and using a funnel 
plot which would skew in shape if chance of publication is greater for statistically 
significant results. Additional statistical methods similar to the funnel plot may be used as 
well. Another way to reduce bias is by updating systematic reviews with new findings and 
controlling for biased literature in meta-analyses.122 Though these preventive methods 
may be used, it is difficult to control the pressure to publish significant results and the 
skewed perceptions and beliefs that may occur once information is popularized and 
demanded in its biased perspective by the public. 
Because the general public gets its information through popular media, the press 
and how it presents developments in the sciences can have a powerful influence. This 
phenomenon is called media attention bias and is perpetuated by newspapers, magazines, 
radio, television and the internet.123 Whiteman et al. (2001) assessed the citation 
frequency of studies in popular media that either do or do not support an association 
between hormone replacement therapy (HRT) and breast cancer.  Of the 32 
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publications, 63% had positive conclusions about HRT and breast cancer association. 
However, of the 203 citations in popular media 82% showed positive studies, signifying 
an excess of citations (p < 0.01).124 Koren and Kelin (1991) looked at American 
newspaper coverage for both a positive and negative study reporting association between 
radiation exposure and cancer. They found that nine of the 19 reports covered only 
positive studies, and the other 10 reports that covered both positive and negative had on 
average 354 words pro positive results versus 192 for negative ones.125  
 The varying sources of publication bias and the way it can be fueled by public 
perception is concerning because it weakens the trust we can have in available empirical 
evidence. Unfortunately, a startling number of scientific studies may be susceptible to 
such bias and may push the trajectory even further. It is more likely for a research 
enterprise to be false than true. Therefore, its perceived accuracy, through citation 
increase and enumerated publications, may just be accurate measures of a prevailing bias. 
John P.A. Ioannidis published an essay titled “Why most Published Research Findings 
Are False” and drafted an outline suggesting the possible sources that promote such 
biases. He found that the smaller the studies conducted and the smaller the effect size, the 
less likely the findings are true.126 The greater the number and the less variety in the types 
of tested relationships, the less likely the findings are to be true.127 Even the more 
flexibility, therefore ambiguity with less standardization, in design, definitions, outcomes, 
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and analysis you give the more likely you can make a negative result into a positive one. 
And to confirm what I have illustrated above with the financially driven pressures, 
Ioannidis described that the more financial and other interests/prejudices invested, the 
less likely the findings are true. The reason may be because of research priorities being 
tied to marketing and advertising rather than finding sound research that supports an 
honest treatment effect. Even when research is booming in a field, the more scientific 
teams involved, the less likely the research is true. Though this may seem paradoxical, 
this may be because of the competitive nature reducing the stringent rigor and constant 
analytic precaution that should be taken to ensure accurate results. This may then 
suppress negative results, unless a competing team has produced a ‘positive’ result worth 
countering. The reason evaluating the state of such biases is important is to realize the 
not-so-perfect nature of the sciences. I hinted at various ways research may be 
compromised with rhetoric, financial concerns, and publication biases exist in current 
literature. When I explore how research into gender, sexual orientation, race, or by 
extension any marginalized identity, is approached, I hope to highlight integral issues in 
such findings further below. By doing so, I hope to show that extrapolated arguments 
from such biased research can perpetuate issues instead of bringing liberation to certain 
identities. This would be just one of the limitations of neuroscience, as an empirical 
enterprise, when considering how it can inform us, if at all relevantly, about social 
identities. 
I have illustrated the varying ways neuroscience, as a scientific field, may be 
susceptible to major issues in its empirical enterprise. It is not a study that has the luxury 
of being isolated in an ivory tower. Instead, the enterprise is fueled by social concerns in 
medicine, psychology, designing artificial intelligence, and understanding of the self. 
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Therefore, there is money to be gained by exploiting such research, and unfortunately it 
is these money-churning machines and industries that provide the resources to scientists 
to pursue their work.  
At a clinical level, where most applications of neuroscience end up, the concerns 
of poorly controlled and biased studies are apparent. For example, the overrepresentation 
of positive results in basic research studies in animal models show discrepancies when 
compared to efficacy demonstrated in clinical studies. Macelod et al. (2004) did a 
systematic review on nicotinamide research. The effect size in animal studies was larger 
(effect size 0.306; 95% CI: 0.241 to 0.371) than was shown in abstract form  (0.162; 95% 
CI: 0.066 to 0.258).128 This means that the treated animals showed more improvement in 
comparison to the treatment effect on control animals in terms of tissue volume and other 
neurological scores. Epidemiological studies have found issues with inconsistencies as well 
in terms of risk of using items like hair dyes, coffee, and presence of DDT metabolites in 
the blood stream, Ioannidis and Trikalinos argue that this may be because “highly 
contradictory results are most tantalizing and attractive to investigators and editors.”129 In 
clinical settings, a new intervention that may be considered more efficacious due to 
publication bias would cost more even if it provides little in terms of improvement 
In clinical trials, a study showing a treatment is harmful that is left unpublished 
may lead to such trials being repeated by other investigators on other patients, putting 
them at risk. For example, a trial of using lorcainide in patients with myocardial 
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infarction found that the treatment group suffered more deaths than the placebo.130 The 
trial was not published due to the disbandment of commercial lorcainide use. However, a 
decade later patients treated with related chemicals of the same Ic antiarrhythmic family, 
encainide and flecainide, showed greater mortality rate. If the original study had been 
published, those following trials could have been avoided. In 2004 Rofecoxib was 
withdrawn because of increased risk of myocardial infarction and stroke indicated by 
unpublished data. Similarly, Pasty and Kronmal found biases on clinical trials of 
rofecoxib for cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease. The drug, with its dangerous 
side-effects, had been distributed to 80 million patients before the study. In 2003 
GlaxoSmithKline faced legal charges due to concealing unpublished clinical findings of 
an increase in suicidality and aggression induced by paroxetine, an SSRI antidepressant, 
on children with depression.131 These cases indicate the grave clinical effects of 
publication bias over-representing the positive efficacy of certain drugs and treatments. 
Additionally, the integrity of scientific research is undermined in the public eye. However, 
these issues still plague the scientific community even after large pharmaceutical 
companies are revealed to manipulate the industry, falsely advertise, or research is shown 
to be either incomplete, skewed, embedded with vested interest, or inconclusive. The 
consequence on the health care system, public policy, and our idea of what science can do 
for us and answer about the mystery of the universe is also skewed. Though I have 
elaborated on the clinical consequences of biomedical research, I am more interested in 
the underlying issues as to why science is seen as the ‘explanatory holy grail’, the power it 
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can wield with its air of truthfulness, and more importantly how that truthfulness can be 
skewed in favor of encouraging certain social biases.  
Stereotype Threat 
The sciences, as I have elaborated above, have the ability to reduce issues and 
naturalize them while negating overlying phenomena that may not be fully accounted for 
or be informed about within empirical evidence. Additionally, sometimes this claim to 
explain phenomena that is outside the reach of scientific research can have problematic 
consequences.  I would consider social biases against marginalized groups to be a 
phenomenon that is reaffirmed by neuroscience’s perceived explanatory power. Below, I 
will elaborate how neuroscience is used to power over marginalized groups by 
naturalizing their differences as biological fact, while negating the social effects that may 
come into play.  
Stereotype threat is a predicament where people feel at risk of conforming to 
social stereotypes.132 Stereotypes are informed by public assumptions of a social groups 
ability to perform on certain tasks. Therefore, if neuroscience participates in demarcating 
where certain groups, either males or females, excel at certain cognitive functions, it can 
affect the performance of each group based on the expectations placed on them. Nosek 
and Banaji (2002), found that there are associations between self identity based on sex 
and personally associating or identifying with mathematics. They gave Implicit 
Association Tasks (IAT) to evaluate identity, implicit attitudes in relation to mathematics, 
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and stereotypes.133 They found that both males and females showed strong identification 
with their gender group, and both showed negative attitudes with math.134 However, men 
showed less negative attitudes and stronger identification with math and science concepts 
compared to women. This then translates to gendered major choices in college, with men 
more present in the hard sciences and women in the arts, due to weak personal 
association of one’s gender identity with specific fields135. Nosek et al. argue that this may 
be because once one strongly identifies with their gender and are socialized into gendered 
preferences, they follow through with performance and expectations of their social 
group.136 Therefore weak and negative personal association of women with mathematics 
may affect their ability to see themselves perform as well as men because of gendered 
expectations. 
Schamder et al. (2008) conducted experiments to see the what psychological 
mechanisms are implicated in stereotype threat scenarios. They argue that stereotype 
threat impairs prefrontal processing, leads to monitoring performance and overall self-
regulation.137 In essence the stress of being cognizant or in the presence of stereotype 
inducing situations leads to disruption of cognitive performance. In one of their 
experiments they tested the negative stereotypes of math performance on women. 
Participants were given a working-memory task where they counted the number of 
vowels in a sentence followed by a 20-minute math test. In the control-condition women 
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learned they would preform the task in an all female setting, while in the experimental, 
stereotype threat condition they learned they would be performing in an all-male setting. 
In the stereotype threat condition women performed significantly more poorly compared 
to the control, suggesting a compromise on working memory that is needed for math 
performance.138  
There have been multiple experiments that show similar effects of stereotype 
threat affecting performance. Krendal et al. (2008) used fMRI to study the neural 
mechanisms underlying women’s underperformance in math. They used 28 right-handed 
female participants from Dartmouth College, with half in the experimental and half in 
the control.139 They were first given an Implicit Association Task (IAT) to categorize 
words such as ‘flowers’ and ‘pleasant’ or ‘insects’ and ‘unpleasant’ respectively.140 Then 
they were given 50 difficult math equations and had 5 seconds on each question to 
determine if they were true or false via key press.141 After finishing the first set of 
problems, the participants were told either “‘research has shown gender differences in 
math ability and performance’” for the experimental condition or ‘‘‘individual differences 
in how personal attitudes. . . modulate performance on cognitive tasks’’’ which had no 
reminder of gender stereotypes.142 With this they were given an IAT corresponding to 
either math/arts or liberal/conservative respective of their experimental condition and 
then given another 50 math problems.143 The participants performed the task while 
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inside an fMRI scanner. The results showed that women who were reminded of sex 
differences in math ability underperformed when compared to women in the control 
condition, who improved, in the second test. This was consistent with findings in previous 
literature. The fMRI analyses showed that women in the control condition showed 
activation in regions associated with mathematical computations, calculations, spatial 
representation of numbers, and mental rotation.144 These regions were mostly in left 
angular gyrus, and in the caudate, thalamus, and cerebellum for difficult tasks. Women in 
the stereotype threat condition did not show recruitment to the above mentioned areas. 
Instead, they showed activity in the ventral Anterior Cingulate Cortex (vACC)145. This 
region is implicated in emotion-regulation, social feedback, social rejection, and generally 
in processing negative social information.146,147 Krendal et al. suggest that activation of 
the vACC during stereotype threat may compromise recruiting other neural networks, 
specifically those involved with working memory in mathematical learning. Thus, the 
issue may be there is a cognitive load from being made aware of stereotypes that 
compromises performance rather than an innate incapacity to perform. 
Likewise, Wraga et al. (2006) looked at fMRI scans to see which brain regions 
were implicated in stereotype-induced shifts in mental rotation performance. Fifty-four 
right-handed women from Dartmouth College were tested on a mental self-rotation task 
where they had to imagine themselves rotating in relation to a 3D multi-cubed object and 
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indicate at which rotational point they would be able to see the cue.148 Eighteen 
participants were placed in a positive-stereotype condition where they were informed 
women performed better in imagined self-rotation tasks.149 Nineteen participants were in 
a negative-stereotype condition where they were informed men perform better on 
imagined self-rotation tasks. And 17 participants were placed in a control condition where 
they received neutral information. RT was measured on correctly identifying the spatial-
rotation, and the participants were scanned in an fMRI scanner during the tasks. They 
found that the mean-proportion error on the self-rotation trials was the best for the 
positive message, average for the neutral message, and the worst for the negative 
message.150 The fMRI results showed that the negative stereotype activated the left 
rostral-ventral anterior cingulate which, as mentioned in the study above, is associated 
with processing negative emotions. Additionally, the right orbital gyrus, which is 
associated with storing knowledge of interpersonal relations such as gender stereotypes, 
and emotions of embarrassment and shame, was implicated.151 In the positive-control the 
superior occipital gyrus, implicated in visual imaging, and the anterior PFC, implicated in 
complex cognitive processing showed increased activity.152 Wraga et al. argue that this 
poorer performance may be due to increased emotional load in the negative-control, with 
neural processing expended in coping with stereotype threat and not at performing the 
task at hand.153 
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Considering the effects of stereotype threat on cognitive functions, the issue 
becomes whether neuroscientific studies that hope to compare the differing mathematical 
or spatial-ability capacity between men and women are measuring innate differences or 
varying performance induced by gendered stereotypes. If neuroscientific evidence that 
suggests women, or any other marginalized identity, are inferior in some mental capacity, 
that information may then feed into stereotypes further exacerbating the issue. 
An Inquiry into Difference 
The evidence provided when naturalizing differences may have scientific validity, 
in the sense that it has been conducted in accordance with scientific standards. However, 
this does not mean it is free from being riddled with biases, such as those mentioned 
above, due to a neuroscientifically ambitious endeavor to explain why certain people are 
the way they are. My goal will be to exemplify this by looking into neuroscientific 
literature that argues that these natural differences, if there are any, suggest the 
discrimination, powering-over, and dehumanizing effects society perpetuates. I will 
specifically focus on naturalistic arguments used against women.  
I suspect that the inconsistencies, methodological weaknesses, rhetorical biases, 
and publication biases are not only indicators of a need to explore difference. 
Additionally, because these concerns are already prevalent, the scenario can be further 
exacerbated through a self-cycling and self-intoxicating process that exaggerates more 
biases within the sciences. By exploring the historical trend of both cultural, medical, and 
neuroscientific literature surrounding how marginalized identities have been naturalized, 
I will hopefully indicate that this trend to look for difference is present. I also want to 
show that not only does it exist, but that it is especially damaging because it uses an 
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empirical evaluation to ‘other’ someone, due to the power the infallible tinge and 
explanatory power associated with science. 
There are social realities that define difference between people. When looking at 
the ‘other’ there are qualities that make them different. Not only is it the spatial, 
temporal, and physical difference from the self and the other, but there are also more 
corporeal factors such as sex, phenotype, skin color, physical ability, mannerisms and 
other phenotypically visible identifiers that create difference. In addition, there are less 
visible differences that may occasionally manifest themselves through social interaction 
such as queer genders and sexualities, and the mentally deviant. The reason such social 
stratifications that arise are relevant is because their defining factor that makes them the 
different from those in power, the normal, or the majority, leads to their being 
marginalized and powered over.  
The way the marginalized are powered over can come through many arguments 
that propose their innate inferiority. This inferiority can be described as an illness or an 
unchangeable, and dooming difference. If the ‘other’ is inferior, the dominant identity 
have power over them. Therefore, the dominant identity can do what it is in the ‘other’s’ 
best interest with a paternalistic attitude or they can determine that the ‘other’s’ 
difference is so debilitating that they be exterminated, controlled, or enslaved for the 
benefit of the dominant group. I will engage the historical process of how this has worked 
in the past as I delve into specific identities that I will cover in sections below. Therefore, 
by arguing inferiority, power can be gained. Specifically, intellectual inferiority can be 
used to power-over. By describing the ‘other’ as intellectually or mentally inferior, the 
dominant group can strip them of their agency, which is traditionally rooted in 
rationality.  
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The reason neuroscience is relevant to this dynamic of creating the the ‘other’ is 
because neuroscience is assumed to have the ability to empirically demarcate who is 
intellectually superior and who is intellectually inferior by describing brain states. We 
already do this by citing evolutionary stages of cephalous development to determine 
which animals are superior and which ones are inferior. And more importantly, this 
translates into how we prioritize the treatment of some animals. Likewise, for those who 
wish to argue to power over a marginalized group, this would therefore be a powerful tool 
to negate the full humanity of the ‘other’. Considering the methodological issues, 
rhetorical biases, publication biases, the competitive nature of the field, ambitious 
enterprise to explain beyond the questions appropriate for the sciences, and the quest for 
novelty and difference, neuroscience may be a useful tool for those who wish to confirm 
their arguments against the marginalized. By exploring the historical trend of the 
neuroscience and the current state of literature that explores difference between a 
dominant and a marginalized group, I will hope to demonstrate that neuroscience is a 
powerful social force that helps power over the ‘other’.  
 66 
Chapter Three 
Neurosexism 
In this section, I will first explore the origins of gender, and what gender theorists 
have to say about this social identity. Considering this I will focus on the two clearly 
identifiable and globally acknowledged binary genders, woman and man. Recognizing 
that other genders may exist, I will focus on the specific binary power differential between 
men and women that dominates the larger discourse around gender inequality. However, 
I will highlight the ambiguity in defining gender as I elaborate some theories to argue that 
gendered qualities are mostly socialized and cannot be naturalized purely to biological 
states. Of course, women and men also are assigned to the major biological sexes of 
female and male respectively. Because of this, arguments of biological variations between 
sexes may be used to reaffirm gendered stereotypes and propagate sexism, specifically 
targeting women. My goal is to explore if this trend in neuroscience currently exists, and 
if it does, what is the impact it can have on the lived experiences of women.  
I will elaborate the historical trend of sexism in the sciences and its predecessors, 
to demonstrate the impact such work has had on naturalizing gender differences. I will 
then explore modern-day research in the neurosciences and the public consumption of 
such information to demonstrate how sexist stereotypes are reaffirmed. I will distinguish 
between productive scientific literature that explores sex-specific neural variances and the 
studies that further complicate things to argue for either the inferiority of women or the 
differential treatment of the sexes in places where such difference may not even be 
necessary, or could possibly be detrimental. By bringing to light some distinctive qualities 
between these two approaches within research, I hope to demonstrate how current 
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neuroscience, and the social power it has to naturalize and claim normative authority, 
could be a dangerous tool that may be misused to oppress women. I will acknowledge 
that though a majority of the research exploring sex does not intend to be sexist, the 
susceptibility is still there to propagate biases. Neuroscience can be argued to suggest 
intellectual superiority or inferiority by comparing brain states between the sexes. 
Additionally, though the current research will most likely not be as explicitly sexist 
relative to the arguments made in the age of medieval anatomy, physiology, psychiatry, 
phrenology, craniology and other such fields, once you get past the neuroscientific jargon, 
the underlying biases and implications become clearer.  
What is Gender? 
Sex is distinct from gender, though it is easy to misconstrue them. Some feminist 
theorists would say that sex denotes biological female and male as defined by producing 
large (eggs) or small (sperm) gametes, differing sex organs, and other dimorphic physical 
features. Gender on the other hand denotes men and women based on their social 
upbringing as defined by their roles and behavior. The word gender was previously 
exclusively used to define words and whether they were feminized or masculinized. An 
example of this would be the el and la articles used in Spanish to indicate masculine or 
feminine noun respectively.154 When psychologists started doing research on trans-people 
in the 1960s, the distinction needed to be made to demarcate biological versus the 
masculine or feminine attributes of a trans person.155 Therefore, sex began to be used for 
biological traits, while gender expressed femininity or masculinity in behavior. The 
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confusion between these terms comes from the fact that in general a person’s assigned or 
identified gender matches their biological sex. 
There are undeniable physical differences between the sexes, be it gametes or 
more macroscopic with sex organs and secondary sexual features. The reason some 
feminist theorists have pushed to make a distinction between sex and gender is to avoid 
the limitations for female liberation that can be made through arguments of biological 
determinism. Biological determinism is the belief that someone’s genes or physiological 
makeup determines their behavior.156 And this defines their appropriate opportunities 
and roles in society. This claim limits the amount of political and social progress women 
could make to improve their social status in society if their feminine condition is 
considered biologically inevitable. Considering the natural facts of sex differences, Gayle 
Rubin, an anthropologist, proposes that gender occurs in the social intervention and 
shaping of the interactions between the biological sexes in what she calls the sex/gender 
system.157 Because gender is the social layer imposed on sex, by potentially eliminating 
gender, but not sex, we can eliminate how women are oppressed into taking the 
subordinate role in society.158 This proposal recognizes sex as an immutable difference, 
but calls to eliminate the social difference that is not a necessary component to one’s 
physical identity. 
If differences exist between two categories of people, they do not become a 
problem until there is a power differential that arises, and one group faces inappropriate 
discrimination for being part of a marginalized category. If sex is that category on which 
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one is discriminated against, it would be called sexism.159,160 The belief in biological 
determinism is one of the major hindrances to the social liberation of women due to the 
resulting arguments that can be made concerning why women may not deserve certain 
rights or opportunities. This is the main argument that plays out in the sciences where 
research seems to propose a normative end on what to make of sex differences between 
males and females. The information gained from such explorations can be used to further 
perpetuate gender norms. In the section below, I will show how biological determinism as 
a historical phenomenon has continued into modern day scientific programs and affects 
neuroscientific research that explores sex differences. 
The History of Misogyny from Myth to The Early Sciences. 
Before I go into early arguments of sex differences, I will outline the 
epistemological heritage of the Western world to demonstrate that sexist beliefs have 
existed since the beginnings of this culture, and are deeply rooted in various belief 
systems. Acknowledging this history is important because the culture we are socialized 
into shapes the concerns, assumptions, and beliefs we apply in our daily life. Even if a 
researcher is trying to be empirically sound, the cultural context of a scientific enterprise 
is still susceptible to biases. 
Ancient Western creation mythology is riddled with misogyny. A closer look at 
such stories highlights the foundations from which the inherent intellectual inferiority of 
women was argued. In the Abrahamic tradition, the story of Adam and Eve demonstrates 
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women’s secondary position. Eve is made from Adam’s rib, always to be at his side. She is 
not much more than a component of the larger part that he is. Her status in society is 
further reduced when she succumbs to the serpent’s temptation and eats from the Tree of 
Knowledge. The result of her persuadability, arguably a mental weakness, leads to the 
exile of mankind from paradise.161 This theme of women’s intellectual weakness is seen in 
Greek mythology as well. Pandora, the first woman, is given a jar containing all the evils 
of the world. She is instructed not to open it, but her curiosity gets the better of her. She 
opens the jar, releases all the evils, and thus dooms mankind to a life of suffering.162 
Again, the theme of disobedience, temptation, and by extension intellectual inferiority 
seem to be the foundations on which the modern-day views of women have emerged. I 
would argue, based on ancient social practices, that these were the first attempts to 
subordinate women calling to the ethos of creation and divine dictate to naturalize 
woman’s place in society. With such stories ingrained into Western culture, the 
intellectual superiority of men and the inferiority of women is believed to be the natural 
norm which fortifies a patriarchy requiring women to be under the custody and ‘superior’ 
decision making capacity of men.  
If divine command and the rhetoric of creation mythologies are not enough to 
demonstrate the belief in women's mental weakness and their need for man’s supervision, 
then Aristotle’s early biological inquiry into the anatomical source of mental function 
might satisfy a more empirical taste. Aristotle argued that the heart was responsible for 
our mental faculty, and the brain was responsible for keeping the heart cool and 
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functioning. This was one of the first attempts to associate the brain with mental 
involvement, though in this case it was done as an indirect function. Though inaccurate 
about the bodily locus of mental function, we can see a misogynistic tint to his anatomical 
claims when he says that women’s brains are smaller and therefore incapable of properly 
regulating the mental heart.163 These creation mythologies and Aristotelian arguments 
continued well into Medieval scientific rhetoric and even until the birth of modern 
science. 
When ancient science and religious myths became outdated, people turned to 
argue for the natural inferiority of women where the ambiguity and uncertainty of myth 
could not be brought into question. One of the early feminine diseases attributed to the 
mind was hysteria. Early accounts suggest that this pathology came from the ancient 
Greek idea of the “wandering womb”.164 The uterus was said to float freely as an entity of 
its own, and as a result there were a myriad of ailments that affected women including 
sleepiness, vertigo, knee problems, and death.165 Thomas Sydenham, a 17th century 
English physician, acknowledges that hysteria, a mental disorder associated with women, 
may not be of uterine origin as previously supposed.166  However, his language still 
suggests the inherent inferiority and susceptibility to nervous disease of the feminine body. 
He argues that hysteria originates from,  “the female being endowed by Nature with a 
more fine and delicate habit of body, as being destined to a life of more refinement and 
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care.”167 The inherent weakness in the female body not only indicates her behavioral and 
intellectual inferiority, but is also why she needs to be protected and taken care of. 
Jessie Allen Fowler describes the phrenological and neuroanatomical works of the 
early 1900s and elaborates the differences between male and female brains. She first 
describes the cranial variations, the difference in brain mass, and physiological differences 
between men and women. From these findings, she argues, “man, as a result of this brain 
development of a differentiated character, shows a mind endowed with judgment, 
creative power and philosophic reasoning ability; and woman, on the other hand, shows 
an insight into the domestic relations, home life, and the social well being of mankind.”168  
These natural attributes are accentuated when each sex is in its appropriate environment. 
Fowler adds, “[s]he is certainly in her element when she has her family around her, is 
giving them advice, and is superintending domestic work.”169 Fowler, however, 
recognizes that women have achieved intellectually and excelled in traditionally 
masculine realms. But how can this be argued for about women without the concern that 
mental exercise would make them sick?170  Fowler argues that these differences do not 
mean superiority, but that there are natural fields where they do excel. In essence men 
are good at certain things, while women at other, but arguable this does not mean either 
of these gendered capabilities are inherently superior to that of the opposite gender. It 
should then be the responsibility of society to, “[e]ducate woman up to the masculine 
standards of thought, and fire her soul with love of God, husband, children, neighbor, 
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home, country, and the world will find in the expression of woman’s opinion on every 
subject a new fountain and oracle of wisdom hitherto unknown.”171 Though this stream 
of thought would seem a liberating and a progressive approach to optimize on strong 
feminine traits, all it does is support gendered roles and suggests that women in their 
inherent weakness should aim for the stronger masculine traits to empower themselves, 
while at the same time embrace their domestic drives.  
Scientific sexism is a concern because of the potential social consequences that can 
result from such determinist arguments. For example, Tori Moi, a literary critic and 
theorist, evaluated the claims made in the book The Evolution of Sex, by Scottish researchers 
Patrick Gedde and J. Arthur Thomson, which was published in Britain in 1889.172 Gedde 
and Thomson argued that men were anabolic and tended to expend energy, while 
females were catabolic and tended to conserve energy. They derived this argument from 
studying protozoa, which they paralleled to the sperm and ovum. Because the protozoa is 
believed to indicate the active or passive nature of the sperm and ovum, respectively, in 
the size of their cellular structure and how they respond to their environment, this would 
then indicate a primordial signifier about the true nature of the sexes.173 In addition to 
making this derivative claim about maleness and femaleness from studying gonadal cells, 
Gedde and Thomson also lay claims to what the social and political implication of their 
finding should be. They argue that giving women the right to vote, involving them in 
competitive industry, or even paying them a fair wage would be contradictory to their 
innate passive nature.174  
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In essence, because biological facts justify social norms, it would be 
counterintuitive to go against the state of nature. Not only has there been a jump made 
from the nature of a single cell, the ovum, to what a woman can and cannot be, but they 
also make a commitment to the naturalistic fallacy.175 The greater concern comes from 
the arguments for the state of social rights and treatments that are made from this 
extrapolation proposed by Gedde and Thomson. This trend in scientific argumentation is 
not antiquated. The essence of aiming towards the dominant qualities, while accepting 
one’s natural inferiority, seems to be the paradoxical pressure which naturalizing social 
differences creates. I will elaborate in the section below on how prematurely normative 
claims on the implications of sex-differences is still carried on in modern day 
neuroscience. 
Neurosexism 
I have detailed above the historical use of the sciences to defend gender roles. In 
this section, I will explore whether neuroscience has anything informative to tell us about 
sex differences and also if it is susceptible to the historical trend of naturalizing gender 
differences. The range of research around gender differences spans from arguments of 
genetic predispositions, variation in hormonal levels of fetuses, analyses of brain structures 
for people with sex inconsistent phenotypes, to animal research on toy preference. I will 
show below that we know that there are physiological differences between males and 
females. These differences may have behavioral effects in reproductive terms, or they 
might not affect behavior at all, even if the neurological behavior may vary. In addition, I 
will show that there are potential therapeutic benefits that could be sex targeted. 
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Knowing this, one might wonder where the issue might rise in studying sex differences in 
the neurosciences.  
We must first acknowledge that there are indeed anatomical differences in organ 
size between males and females, due to general difference in body size, as well as the 
physical differences in reproductive organs between them. At the fetal stage, the 
mammalian brain shows an abundance of estrogen, androgen, and progesterone 
receptors which can then be specifically sex targeted based on the presence of the fetus’ 
own gonadal hormones, uterine maternal hormones, or other environmental factors.176 
The brain thus sexually differentiates in the concentration of types of receptors in regions 
such as the hypothalamus, preoptic areas, spinal nucleus of the bulbocavernosus (SNB).177 
Mostly testicular hormones are responsible for such changes, because the default anatomy 
is female.178 Perinatal effects of estradiol, and its precursor testosterone, are crucial for 
setting up the potential for pubertal changes and development of secondary sex 
characteristics. The release of gonadotropin releasing hormones (GnRH) by GnRH 
neurons at the onset of puberty leads to release of steroid hormones.179 This affects the 
sex differentiated receptors, as mentioned above,  and this then leads to the independent 
restructuring of neural circuits for sexual development of gonads, motivation, behavior, 
and performance respectively.180 Thus, the fetal variation in receptor sites between males 
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and females sets-up the possibility of secondary sexual characteristics. Therefore, the 
brain structures may be relevant in the production of behavioral features associated with 
sex-specific behaviors. For example, prolactin, in addition to inducing lactation in the 
mammary gland,  is known to increase neurogenesis in the subventricular zone of the 
lateral ventricle (SVZ), which is implicated in mediating nurturing maternal behaviors in 
females.181 This is not a process males go through.  
In addition to reproductive differences and variations in neural circuits and 
regions involved in the process, there could be structural variations between males and 
females, though the behavioral output may not be affected.182 This idea that structure 
may vary but the behavioral output or the realization of a phenomenon may be in 
essence the same is called multiple realizability (MR).183 Though this concept is mostly 
explored in studies within philosophy of mind, there is empirical evidence that suggests 
that different brain states may produce the same behavioral results, suggesting different 
integrative processes may be involved. We have to recognize that the brain sizes do differ 
between men and women, but the brain is capable of completing the same function in 
various different ways.184 
Keller and Menon conducted a study to see if there were structural and functional 
differences in the neuroanatomy between males and females when doing mathematics. 
They used an fMRI on 25 females and 24 males, age of 18 to 36 years, during an 
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arithmetic task involving addition and subtraction.185 Then they analyzed differences in 
brain states using voxel-based morphometry (VBM).186 What they found was there was 
no significant difference in terms of accuracy between males and females on trials, and 
neither was there a significant difference in reaction time between the sexes.187 However, 
the brain images told a different story. There was more activation during the mental 
arithmetic task in males than females in the intraparietal sulcus and adjoining superior 
parietal lobe, the right angular gyrus, the right lingual gyrus, and the right 
parahippocampal gyrus, which are regions implicated in the dorsal and ventral visual 
stream.188 In general, however, there was considerable overlap in brain regions activated 
between the sexes as well. Keller and Menon tried to account for this discrepancy where 
different brain states accounting for the same behavioral output by proposing that males 
and females may use different cognitive strategies or that different structural processes for 
women have greater gray matter density in areas where males showed greater functional 
activation.189 This study demonstrates that there could be structural differences between 
two people without there being a necessary functional difference. A similar cognitive 
performance was observed, though the brain activity observed through the fMRI was 
different. Yet arguments are made that because males and females have different brain 
states when engaging in an activity, there may be fundamental differences between them 
that justify differential treatment between the sexes. This again is an underlying issue 
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rooted in the belief that physical difference translates to a different function, and therefore 
justifies different treatment.  
If there is relevance to considering anatomical differences between the sexes, the 
most useful application would be in sex-specific therapeutic targets. Considering males 
and females are physiologically different, the receptor distribution, neural circuitry, and 
hormone levels need to be considered to properly target a disease, especially if it is 
expressed differentially between the sexes. A study was conducted by Fleisher et al. on the 
role of Apolipoprotein E ε4 (APOE*E4) allele on mild cognitive impairment in males and 
females.190 They evaluated the effect on hippocampal volume and memory performance 
on a delayed word recall task of those with the APOE*E4 allele, in 86 women and 107 
men.191 For men neither the presence of one APOE*E4 allele nor two genes was a 
significant predictor of hippocampal volume. While for women, having one or two 
APOE*E4 alleles were both significant predictors of hippocampal volume.192 This 
difference may be associated with menopause in women and endocrine changes in 
estrogen availability as a result. Estrogen tends to protect from plaque formation in the 
female brain, while in men testosterone may be playing this protective effect.193 
Therefore, introducing estrogen in this hippocampal region of the brain may alleviate or 
prevent the genesis of such cognitive symptoms or reduce hippocampal mass in women 
who are past menopause. In this study, the intention to provide a functional therapy for a 
sex-specific disorder demonstrates a productive use of neuroscience that isn’t ridden with 
biased intents or extrapolations.  
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The problem of studying sex differences emerges when differences are used in 
ways that reiterate gender stereotypes and ignore the social, cultural, environmental, and 
other non-biological factors that may play into perceived differences and, by extension, 
neurological variation between the sexes. I argue that this attitude is rooted in a 
patriarchal society where values such as determination, logical skills, and objectivity that 
are prioritized and are strongly associated with masculinity. Thus, in a society determined 
by male-dominated values, those who embody male-associated characteristics gain power 
and social worth. When stereotypes of femininity such as weakness, emotionality, and an 
inability to be logical are socially reaffirmed and then claimed to be biologically 
naturalized, the consequence is the disenfranchisement of women. I will show below that 
modern day neurosciences have such effects not only by arguing for a necessary locus for 
social weakness in the feminine brain, but also by extending such an argument to propose 
a normative place for women in society. 
If we start at the beginnings of neurological and physiological differences in sex 
differentiation, we would return to the fetal environment where variations in receptor 
distribution and gonadal release of hormones regulate the male and female brains. Due to 
the ethical implications of gene-modification research with human subjects, most of the 
work has been done on fish, birds, rats, and monkeys. There is already the issue of 
extrapolating to human brains and behavior from animal models. Hormonal 
comparisons on genital tissue may be reasonable as they have shown to have similar 
functions in both human and non-human species, but at a cortical level, functions may 
drastically vary.194 What may be present in other animals may not have been preserved in 
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human subjects, therefore more research needs to be done before conclusions are made. 
Additionally, the cortical structure variations may be due to environmental factors and 
socialization and not entirely based in biologically determined factors. Through the 
process of bio-looping, a concept I will elaborate further in the final chapter, the external 
environment, including information about prior research affecting the behavior in 
question, may affect the organisms’ internal behavior. Thus their behavior will be 
modified by that knowledge, and then they may play out the behavior reaffirming the 
research findings.195 This cycle is self-feeding, and might help explain the perceived 
stereotypical gender differences between males and females. The concept of bio-looping 
may be especially relevant to the phenomenon of stereotype threat in women, where 
being made aware of ‘scientific’ variances between genders may lead to performing 
poorly in examinations where men, not women, are expected to excel.   
The concept of gender generally plays out postnatally, where gender is confirmed 
more as a performance that either does or does not align with what is normatively set and 
expected from each sex. Judith Butler argues that gender is sustained through “the tacit 
collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as 
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions— and the punishments 
that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction ‘compels’ our belief in its 
necessity and naturalness.”196 When the gendered person is not visible, such as during 
pregnancy, there is a strong sense to label the fetus through some indication of gender. 
Through analysis of pregnancy folklore before the age sex-determination via ultrasound, 
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we can see the application of stereotypes to unveil a baby’s gender. For example, “If he is 
active it is a boy; calm, it is a girl.” or “If you carry the baby low, it is a boy, and high, a 
girl.”197 Much of this folklore has been abandoned with the rise of ultrasound analyses, 
but regardless, the need to gender is still present. This may be because the family can give 
the first indication of a social identity to the fetus and mentally prepare for how it will be 
socially received once born.  
This need to label gender carries on even for differentiating newborns who have 
not been socialized yet. The argument is that if there is a difference in newborns, then the 
reason may be biological. For example, Connellan et al. studied the time 102 neonates 
(males n=44, females n=58) spent looking at a face (social stimuli) or a physical-
mechanical mobile, to see if there were behavioral differences between males and 
females.198 Prior to this study, the earliest sign of sexual dimorphism in sociability 
(measured by eye-contact) was studied at 12 months of age.199 Connellan et al. matched 
the stimuli for color, size, shape, contrast, and dimensionality.200 The time spent, in 
seconds, looking at the stimulus was recorded and coded by judges blind to the infant’s 
sex. A χ2 analysis showed an association between sex and stimulus supporting the 
hypothesis of male preference for the mechanical and female preference for the social. 
And a t-test confirmed the suspicions with males looking longer at the mobile (t = 2.3, df 
= 100, p = 0.02), and females looking longer at the face (t = 2.4, df =100, p = 0.02).201 
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This was statistically significant, meaning that the probability of males disproportionately 
focusing on the mobile and females disproportionately focusing on the face is not due to 
chance. With these findings of statistical significance, the authors argued that unlike 
previous work that was done at 12 months of age, and thus may be confounded with 
socialization, this neonatal study is more valid to argue for an innate biological sex-
differentiation. Conellan et al. concluded, “At such an age, these sex differences cannot 
readily be attributed to postnatal experience, and are instead consistent with a biological 
cause, most likely neurogenetic and/or neuroendocrine in nature.”202 The authors’ intent 
when pursuing this study was to find evidence for biological substrates in sex-stereotypical 
behavioral differences that are observed later in life. 
Though the authors do not explicitly state it as such, the implications of this study 
are clear: women are not made for math and physics, and therefore should amplify their 
innate social skills/preference for more feminine friendly careers. Though this seems like 
a gross extrapolation, such reasoning has been widely disseminated based on this study. 
For example, Peter Lawrence, an academic at Cambridge University, has argued that we 
cannot expect women to be well represented in more masculine fields like physics. 
Additionally, Baron-Cohen reaffirms this belief suggesting that these are the beginnings 
from which gender differences are amplified from innate foundations. Therefore, he 
argues that appropriate female representation in traditionally masculine fields is not 
something to be expected.203  
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Unfortunately, the study suffers from many methodological issues and confounds. 
For example, a neonate’s visual capacity and attention is not optimal during the few days 
following birth, and short-term attention does not even show significant development 
until past about 3 to 4 months of age.204 Additionally, the trial conditions were not 
consistent concerning where the infant was positioned when the measurements for 
attention were taken. The extrapolations that can be made from this study are clear, and 
it parallels the arguments of its predecessors that gender-stereotypic behavior is innate. As 
with the arguments of the Gedde and Thomson from the 19th century, such research can 
be misused to advise social and political policy around gender.  
Another area of inquiry, brain lateralization, is said to be associated with variation 
in cognitive and mathematical performance between men and women. Differences in 
interhemispheric interaction has been found to indicate varying intellectual ability 
between mathematically gifted adolescents and other controls. The findings suggest better 
cortical coordination between hemispheric activity may be associated with the superior 
mathematical performance.205 Therefore, people have looked into male and female 
lateralizations to see if there was a difference. Initially arguments were made that males’ 
hemispheric unilateralization was responsible for their more ‘focused’ spatial ability and 
superior mathematical skills.206 However, when contradictory findings came through, 
such as the one mentioned above that suggested more lateralization and coordinated 
interhemispheric activity, arguments started shifting to say that men in fact had more 
                                                
 
204 John Colombo, D. Wayne. W. Mitchell, and Frances D. Horowitz, “Infant Visual Attention in the 
Paired-Comparison Paradigm: Test-Retest and Attention-Performance Relations,” Child Development 59, no. 
5 (1988): 1207, doi:10.2307/1130483.  
205 Harnam Singh and Michael W. O’Boyle, “Interhemispheric Interaction During Global–Local 
Processing in Mathematically Gifted Adolescents, Average-Ability Youth, and College Students,” 
Neuropsychology 18, no. 2 (2004): 336, doi:10.1037/0894-4105.18.2.371.  
206 Fine, Delusions of Gender, 105. 
 84 
bilateral activity than females. This should already indicate some of the biases within the 
sciences that tries to accommodate findings that place males as predestined for 
superiority. Leonard et al. found that the variation in physical size between males and 
females is responsible for why cerebral volume differs. They found that 21% individual 
differences were accounted by variations in cerebral volume, and 4% due to sex 
differences.207 But still there is no fully conclusive global trend. Similar to the concept 
described above, men and women may structurally vary, but their cognitive functions 
may still be the same.  
When consumed by the public, such sex-stereotyping research can have drastic 
effects. A study conducted by Victoria Brescoll and Marianne LaFrance evaluated 209 
articles from 29 U.S. newspapers concerning whether the cause of sex/gender differences 
were innate or acquired.208 They found that conservative newspapers, compared to 
liberal ones, more often tended to attribute gender differences to biological causes. 
Scientists who also act as popularizers, such as Baron-Cohen mentioned above, tie in 
their own beliefs on sex and further exacerbate the issue.209 The consequence of this is 
attitudes to educational policy and public policy may change in order to accommodate 
the sex-based findings. 
 Some would argue that if sex differences do exist, why do we not help nurture 
more feminine traits such as strong contextual verbal ability or empathy? This would 
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mean capitalizing on the natural inclinations of the sexes to make society more efficient 
instead of pushing women to do what would not be ideally profitable for them. The first 
issue with this assumption is that sex research in the neurosciences is conclusive on the 
point of what behaviors are maximized in each sex.210 Unfortunately, neuroscience is 
riddled with ambiguities and are not fully conclusive in their findings to the point of 
informing social policy. Replication studies need to be conducted, and confounding 
variables and poor experimental structures need to be reevaluated before stronger 
proclamations about sex or gender can be brought forward. The second issue is the belief 
that women should value their feminine traits and make the most of what nature has 
given rather than fighting an uphill battle in a world dominated by masculine values. 
Unfortunately, this heavily underestimates the impact the patriarchy has had in defining 
what social values are at the top (the masculine), and which ones are considered socially 
weak or detrimental or less important (the feminine). One solution could be that we work 
within the social context we are given and try to negate false claims of female inferiority 
within scientific literature. Another option may be to dismantle the current value system 
and construct one where both feminine and masculine traits are equally valued, so that 
even if there is a natural difference between the sexes, it would not be relevant in terms of 
social power differentials. Additionally, who is to say that even if male-attributed values, 
such as rationality, spatial ability, or mathematical skills, are not optimized for the female 
brain that women are inherently incapable of embracing these values?  
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Why Is This Relevant? What Can Be Done? 
There are inarguable sex differences that exist between males and females in 
terms of their neurobiology. From the chromosomal beginnings, there are already genetic 
markers that set for phenotypic dimorphisms later in life. Additionally, the fetal 
environment and the hormonal changes that occur during this period bring forth the 
presence of primary sexual features. During puberty, secondary sexual features develop as 
a result of hormones released from the brain acting with the genitals. Behaviorally, this 
may pan out to differing sexual behaviors as well as cognitions, such as maternal 
behavior, depending on what has been evolutionarily conditioned to favor reproduction. 
However, this all begs the questions, why does one sex gain more power in society than 
the other? How do certain sex-related behaviors or cognitive patterns that we see lead to 
differential treatment, in the sense of creating a dominant and subordinate? 
The issue that I highlighted at first was that our society and culture has a 
propensity towards sexism. Whether the subordination of women is the natural order of 
things is not something we can know for sure unless we return to the genesis of mankind 
to see the way things were in the beginning. However, this is not possible. Instead, we 
should be aware that the process of ‘othering’ is a relentless enterprise that benefits those 
who dominate. Though at a surface level, social language, policies, and behavior may 
change to seem more progressive, underlying biases continue to find a way to covertly 
affect the marginalized. Even if there is a biologically determinant condition as to why 
women in some ways behave differently than males, it does not justify social policy 
differentially acting on such claims. Because we live in a male value-laden society, women 
who embrace these values can have social mobility and a certain degree of liberation. But 
the woman’s body has been marked as inferior and at times incapable of achieving these 
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male-attribute values. They are then encouraged to pursue more feminine tasks. This 
propels the primary stereotypes, and then misinforms the empirical sciences on what they 
should be looking for in their research.  
Inherently, male-associated and female-associated values may not be present in 
the sexes, however through association and socialization they become linked. Therefore, 
whenever I use these phrases of masculine, male-associated, feminine, or female-
associated I am not arguing that they are necessary qualities of either sex. My hope was to 
highlight the historical trend of sexism as it progressed into modern day neuroscience, to 
highlight the problematic arguments for the inferiority of women. Such arguments have 
changed from the explicitly sexist claims in the past. They become subtler and nuanced in 
their appearance as time progresses and people abandon more brute sexist language. 
However, this does not negate the psychological effects it can have on women and their 
ability to progress. Additionally, it makes it more difficult to address institutional and 
systematic problems that overlay social systems and still hinder women. What this means 
then is that a more nuanced approach must be taken to evaluating the ways sexism can 
weave itself into seemingly objective disciplines. The consequences are seen in the public 
consumption of such information, and the response in social policy that limit women's 
access to resources and realizing themselves in fields traditionally dominated by men. It 
may seem progressive that we encourage women to maximize feminine traits that they 
may be innately suited for, but that language is no less impactful than sexist arguments 
that limit the roles of each gender. In a culture normed in male-associated values, it 
would be very difficult to redefine what values are culturally celebrated and to make 
feminine traits be equally respected. Therefore, women have to work within the system 
and a culture rooted in stereotypically masculine values, and thus need to maximize such 
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skills in order to advance socially. There are many obstacles that women face on the way 
to socially advance, but neuroscientific findings should not be one of them.   
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Chapter Four 
The Significance of Normalcy 
 Thus far, I have provided a historical account of neuroscience and its relation to 
women. The reason I did so was to replicate and continue the critique Foucault provided 
in Madness and Civilization and Birth of the Clinic. Foucault looked into the history of mental 
treatment in European history and analyzed the shifts in attitudes and the consistencies in 
dehumanizing practices over the centuries. Through this critical lens and historicist 
approach, he was able to develop a thorough criticism of both the ideologies surrounding 
therapy and the ideas of sanity. I hoped to apply a similar approach and framework by 
looking at trends of sexism in the neurosciences and its predecessors. Additionally, I 
hoped to highlight how through this historical process, the incomplete and stagnating 
dialectic of the Lord and Bondsman is realized. However, I have not given a thorough 
account for what specifically is motivating a dominant identity to power-over another. I 
will argue below that in the process of reducing the other for the self, in order to gain 
recognition, there is also pressure put on the ‘other’ to modify themselves to be ‘normal’. I 
will explore this concept and argue the idea of normalcy, as it has been developed 
through statistical distributions, is what has given neuroscience the power to articulate 
mental normalcy, and who either fits or does not fit within those bounds. In essence, this 
gives those who have the ability to statisticize brain states the power to ‘other’ those who 
are not within the limits of what they define as normal. Above, I have demonstrated this 
through the analysis of previous neuroscientific literature comparing both male and 
female brains, and describing female brains as outliers from the range of normalcy in 
relation to brain states signifying socially favored behavior.  
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I will then look at Herbert Marcuse’s idea of one-dimensional thinking and how 
social progress is stifled as a result of technological advances that give rise to the false 
belief that more choices mean more freedom. I will build on his arguments to suggest that 
that neuroscience should challenge its own assumptions in order to aid social progress 
rather than subscribing to an established, marginalizing, and bias-ridden ideological 
framework. Finally, I will recapitulate earlier philosophical concerns that I raised, and I 
will suggest that a similar historico-genealogical process is present among other 
marginalized identities. Therefore, neuroscience and its social implications must be taken 
seriously if we are to make any progress in using the information we gain for the benefit of 
society.  
Normalcy and Its Relation to Pathology 
 Before the birth of statistics, the idea of normal was contrasted with the 
pathological. Considering my critique rests on the biomedical implications of 
neuroscience research, I will elaborate on the distinction Georges Canguilhem makes in 
his book, The Normal and The Pathological.  Normal is etymologically defined as that which 
conforms to the regular, and does not bend to the left or to the right, and from there two 
definitions are produced: 1) how something ought to be, and 2) the average or majority 
standard of a measurable characteristic.211 When these two definitions are conflated it 
generates the issues we see with the way arguments of normalcy become problematic. In 
medicine this translates to the ideal habitual state of the body. Additionally, this state 
incorporates a self-healing processes aimed to return the body to stasis when distressed, or 
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at least indicates where therapeutics can be targeted.212 Biological pathology, or a 
diseased state, deviates from bodily normality as it pertains to maintaining life. Anomalies 
are variations from what is considered normal, simply by fact that they deviate. However, 
difference does not necessitate pathology.213 Pathology etymologically suggests a diseased 
state, implying life gone wrong.214 One way of defining the pathological is by defining 
normal and abnormal (abnormal being an adjectival form of anomaly) in terms of 
statistical frequency.215  Then the normal person becomes the normative ideal, and sets 
the values for organic norms.216 Therefore, an anomaly, when described as deviant and 
statistically charted in comparison to a majority notion of normal, can be driven into the 
realm of pathology and thus necessitate therapeutic adjustment.217  
 In addition to the ambiguous nature whereby someone who deviates from the 
norm can be deemed pathological, the environment and its relation to the normal is also 
conditional. For example, a trait may be considered normal in one environment as 
necessary compromise for survival. An example is sickle cell trait, which provides a 
protective feature for those living in malaria ridden areas, while otherwise compromising 
health.218 Another issue is that what would be considered an abnormal feature may not 
interfere at all pathologically, such as an extra digit on a hand or foot.219 Yet there is a 
tendency to attribute a normative value to these irrelevant deviations from what is 
considered normal. Canguilhem points out that the human body is not only a product of 
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our relationship to nature and the environment, but is also a social creation as well. 
Therefore it might not just be that something is determined as normal because of its 
frequency, but it is very likely that it is seen as frequent due to normative pressures in a 
certain social environment.220 This social environment may be predicated on a dominant 
group’s attributes being valued as ‘normal’. What I have hoped to elaborate by analyzing 
the distinction that Canguilhem provides etymologically for the normal and the 
pathological is that it is not just a difference in life-states of an organism. Instead, the 
distinction is very ambiguous and is determined either through charting statistical 
distributions, environmental relevance to an organism, and also more importantly 
through normative pressures due to the social influence in creating the human organism.  
Statistical Determinism and Normalcy 
 In order to better elaborate the influence of statistics in demarcating normality, we 
need to look into the history and paradigm shifts in attitudes towards statistical validity, to 
better conceptualize how statistics aids neuroscience in passing judgment on marginalized 
groups. As I mentioned above, the idea of normalcy, especially when statistically labeled, 
puts pressure on those who are deviant to aim towards a more normal or majority 
expression. In essence what happens is that the idea of chance and anomalies are 
controlled for by the pressure to be normal. Ian Hacking, in his book The Taming of Chance, 
explores these ideas by accounting for the shift from concepts of human nature to a model 
where human variation was charted on a normal curve.221 This nurtured the idea of 
chance, and eroded the idea of determinism.222 With a greater indeterminism, we could 
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have the potential to control variations and move away from what otherwise would have 
been a determined teleology. However, the new statistical laws gained an objective 
validity, and the right to not just describe frequency, but also to explain and provide 
understanding for a natural phenomena.223 
 Instead of exploring the full extent of the politico-historical development of 
statistics in the Euro-American context, I will begin where the development of the normal 
curve impacts concepts of normality and paves the way for a statistical infallibility. As I 
mentioned above, in my account from Canguilhem, the impact of the normal curve is 
critical in demarcating normalcy. Adolphe Quetlet, a 19th century Belgian statistician, 
was one of the strongest proponents of using the normal distribution in anthropometry, 
social analysis, and criminology.224 Before his application of the normal curve to bio-
social metrics, it was seen as a distribution with a mean and standard deviation that was 
fixed on real quantities from a binomial coin-toss where we expect a fixed distribution 
around how many heads and how many tails we can get.225 However, in humans, the 
mean is not a real quantity. Quetlet transformed the mean into a real quantity by 
charting features of the average man, or homme type.226 This resulted in a massive growth 
in recording human metrics, from moral attributes to the ability to write poetry, that were 
then fit under the normal curve.227 This provided room for eugenic ideas where social 
policies could be installed to either preserve or alter attributes in a population.228 The 
major issue with the leap of applying the normal curve to human variance is that the 
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normal curve is derived from accounting for the errors in a single coin toss. The 
complexity that produces human traits from the genetic, cultural, social, environmental, 
and biological is not fully accounted for when passing normative judgments from a 
distribution of a single attribute.229 Though, there may be some benefits in predictive 
potential when measuring variance in human metrics, acknowledging that human social 
and biological traits are not simply a conglomeration of a number of random processes, 
like coin tosses, like coin tosses, may control the drive to misconstrue statistical findings. 
 Considering how the normal curve was applied to human metrics, I wish to 
describe how this then ties into the idea of normalcy. As mentioned above, the idea of 
normal is intertwined with the pathological in a medical sense, but in the 1820s, the word 
normal began to be used more widely to describe behaviors, diplomatic relations, and 
even the state of molecules.230 The power of the word ‘normal’ came from its dual 
ambiguity where it accounts both for what is typical and also for what something ‘ought’ 
to be.231 Additionally, as I described in my analysis of  The Birth of the Clinic, a similar shift 
around the 1800s happened where the pathological was isolated to the malfunction of a 
single organ rather than excess or deficiency in a sick individual as a whole.232 This 
compartmentalization paralleled the demands of the industrializing world, where 
components could be replaced as long as there was an easily exchangeable standard in 
the cogs of a machine.233 Though the distinction between the normal and the 
pathological originated in a medical context, in a rapidly industrializing world that 
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profited from standardization and predictability, the argument of Auguste Comte and the 
distinction he made between normal and pathological societies, supported by statistical 
accounts, demanded that revolutionary positivism and normalcy be something we should 
strive for.234  
 Therefore, the understanding that the idea of normalcy is related to a concept of 
disease, to a statistical average or majority, and moral demands outlines why it is 
concerning. With the shift towards statistical determinism and evaluating statistical laws 
as objective predictors, and not just an account of expected variances, the pressures to be 
normal become an obligation. Therefore, we are obliged to tame chance and variation 
and return it to a standard state of what a person should be. In neuroscience, charting 
brain states and averaging the neural physiology as they do in brain map databases leads 
to the creation of deviations that may not necessarily be pathological. A false sense of 
normalcy is created that still has the capacity to place normative pressures on those who 
deviate neurologically. Thus there needs to be a greater suspicion of statistical 
distributions that account for human metrics, especially where if falls within such a value 
laden organ as the brain.  
 Considering the distinction made above, I hope to explore a specific instance of 
how social expectations influence ideas of normalcy. Ian Hacking, in The Social Construction 
of What, describes how the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test was developed and eventually 
became a test for normal intelligence from those who were mentally deficient on one end, 
and geniuses on the other. Alfred Binet and Lewis Terman developed this test believing 
that biological characteristics should be modeled on a normal probability curve.235 When 
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Terman discovered that women did better on the IQ test than men, and considering 
women “couldn’t” be more intelligent, the questions were revised. It was considered a 
synthetic a priori fact that women cannot be more intelligent than men. Thus this should 
hint at the issues surrounding a dominant identity positing themselves as the threshold of 
normalcy. Additionally, this critical factor in the formation of the IQ test indicates the 
biases that precede statistical standards, and the human element responsible in the social 
construction of what intelligence looks like. Considering the IQ test is at times taken as a 
valid evaluator of intelligence, and then conflating that with its sexist roots, the claims the 
test makes to be able to measure certain attributes of intelligence need to be taken with a 
grain of salt.  
What Should We Do with Neuroscience? 
The issue of social marginalization via the neurosciences is multifaceted. Firstly, 
there are underlying social biases and assumptions feeding the research inquiries as well 
as how results are presented. Secondly, the statistical determinist attitudes give undue 
validity to brain averages and concepts of normalcy charted from neuroscientific 
research. Considering this, what should neuroscience do? Below, I will explore Herbert 
Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensional thinking in his book One-Dimensional Man. This 
should indicate how repression is produced when social change is not possible because 
people identify with an oppressive system by subscribing to one-dimensional thinking. 
Additionally, this will lay out the ideas that provide a normative marker for the 
neurosciences to consider to more appropriately contextualize the brain, body, and mind 
in light of technological advances.  
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Marcuse starts by critiquing our sense of complacency and near universal 
acceptance of our unfreedom as a result of technological progress.236 This is the result of 
one-dimensional thinking that does not critique or challenge social assumptions, and thus 
leads us to ignore liberating possibilities. Two-dimensional thinking on the other hand is 
negative thinking, that comes through a dialectical process where there is crucial intent 
that enables us to recognize forces of domination.237 The problem with one-dimensional 
thinking is that people believe they are freer than they really are due to homogenous 
complacency. It requires a obedience to a system that satiates and preserves such 
thought.238 When people’s physical needs are met, and whatever material goods they 
demand is available, they stay satisfied with what they are given.239 Similarly, people are 
not apt to question neuroscience because it provides productive insight into 
neuropathologies and the research does help in identifying viable therapies. If people 
identify with their oppressors and are apt to gain from the goods given to pacify them, the 
result is the stifling of political discourse.  
To overcome such one-dimensional thinking, Marcuse suggests that we embrace 
two-dimensional thought that liberates through a dialectical process of critiquing society. 
Through self-determination and by embracing ourselves as individuals liberated from 
indoctrination and manipulation, we can know the facts and evaluate what our true 
options can be.240 This is not a false sense of individual potential, where the celebration of 
potential is still under the subscription of dominating forces of normalcy and 
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complacency. According to Marcuse, the ultimate form of domination is when the 
dominator administrates avenues for mass consumption and deludes those who are 
dominated into thinking that such a life is a good life.241 The notion of neuroplasticity and 
the routes for therapeutics and neural modulations replicates such demands on those who 
are considered abnormal. The potential for cure and the ability to be normal can create a 
large surgical or pharmaceutical market for therapeutics that profit off this constructed 
insecurity. Therefore, if Marcuse’s critique is applied, and the only way to liberate oneself 
from a domineering and oppressive system is through critique, neuroscience needs to be 
open to criticism where its assumptions fail to provide support for the normative 
judgments based on neuroscience and thus may participate in oppression.  
My hope through this paper was not to deny the benefits neuroscience has to offer 
society, but instead to scrutinize the enterprise and its social consequences, to highlight 
the ways it can be used to propagate social marginalization. I applied a hisotrico-
geneological critique extending the concerns Foucault set out to look at in both the 
psychiatric and clinical practice. This was rooted in the Hegelian Lord-Bondsman 
framework, where I argued that there is a stagnating dialectic between those who 
dominate and those who are oppressed. The capacity to scrutinize, reduce, dissect, and 
analyze gives an observer power to define and objectify whoever they observe. Arguably, 
the male-dominated historical enterprise of the sciences has done this with biological 
determinist arguments for a woman’s innate inferiority, stemming from some deficiency 
in her intellectual apparatus. I looked at the history of the neurosciences and 
demonstrated that this sexist trend did, and currently, continues to exist. This is primarily 
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because the neurosciences are inextricably tied to social values, for it serves the medical 
demands of society. Additionally, the use of statistics has been crucial due to the 
quantitative and metric objectivity needed in the rhetoric of presenting scientific 
evidence. However, in the process of quantifying neural metrics, the argued average brain 
states have been conflated with the ambiguous definition of the word ‘normal’ as 
indicated by my account of statistical history. Due to a paradigm shift with a newly 
adopted attitude towards statistical determinism, people are accepting their neural or 
psychometric variance as dooming them to an inferior status as ‘abnormal’. The 
complexity of human nature is not fully considered in such statistical distributions, 
however the objective and numerical allure buffers neuroscientific evidence from full 
scrutiny about the implications of their findings.  
Additionally, even where neuroscience seems to provide liberatory benefits, the 
enterprise is still susceptible to propagate domination and marginalization. This is not 
because of any inherent issue in the idea of neural possibility, instead it is because social 
assumptions of what a normal or desirable brain should look like go unchecked. For 
example, in a society dominated by male-centric values, women would be pressured to 
emulate such attributes. If the argument could be made that certain brain states lead to 
the expression of masculine traits, then women would be pressured to emulate similar 
cognitive states predicated on a gender-biased valuation. To compliment this, Marcuse’s 
critique of one-dimensional thinking and how it stifles political discourse and social 
progress is relevant. Unless we challenge ourselves to participate in two-dimensional 
thinking that critiques society and social institutions as they are, we cannot know out true 
options and would be susceptible to be complacent and thus subscribe to the delusion of 
freedom that dominating forces impose on the oppressed. Therefore, it would be better if 
 100 
those who engage in the neurosciences recognize this issue, and are ready to address how 
their endeavors are informed and influenced by underlying social biases.  
What Is the Greater Significance? 
If the ethical implications that I framed in the first chapter are considered, there 
needs to be a respect for individuality as it is. However, there is a clear line, based on 
potential harms to self or others, about when certain notions of individual expressions 
become concerning in a seriously pathological or socially dangerous way. It is therefore 
inappropriate to interfere or denigrate those who have different brain states to the 
margins if their neural differences do not interfere with leading their lives and social well 
being. Though I did not explore the relationship between the neurosciences and other 
easily recognized socially marginalized identities, the trends of ‘othering’, by arguing 
neural deficiency and therefore intellectual or social inferiority, do carry over.  
For example, the superiority of the White race had been attributed to their larger 
cranium.242 Arguments for the animalistic and therefore necessarily subordinate nature of 
people of color, particularly of African peoples, had been attributed to a perceived 
disproportionate distribution of nerves to primal organs and a size reduction in the 
brain.243 Additionally, refusing to subordinate to white people was even given psychiatric 
diagnoses such as drapetomania: the mental illness that leads slaves to run away.244 Even 
current literature reflects how social biases can feed into the interpretation of 
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neuroscience. For example, the book Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structures in American 
Life, by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray has been criticized in aiding racist 
ideologies.245  Other books, such as the Mismeasure of Man by Stephen J Gould, argue in 
support of social darwinism and biological determinism to explain the differences among 
social groups. The antiquated arguments of brain size and neural mass correlations have 
not died either, with scientists such as Rushton and Ankney using MRI scans and cranial 
measurements to argue racial differences.246 With the advent of social awareness of racist 
language and biases, my arguments look for stricter scientific and empirical validity while 
avoiding the blatant linguistic signifiers of racism from the past.  
 Queer and transphobia transitioned from a dogmatic stigma, to psychiatric 
diagnoses,247, 248 and eventually to neuroscientific claims249 that describe the mental 
attributes that lead to deviation from heteronormative and gender normative behavior to 
be ‘“excess’, ‘deficiency’, or ‘imbalance’”250 in the expression of neural matter. In essence, 
queer and trans people were considered to be psychiatrically ill, and therefore our 
obsession of looking for differentiation through neurological imbalance compliments the 
                                                
 
245 Joseph L. Graves, “The Pseudoscience of Psychometry and The Bell Curve,” Journal of Negro Education 6, 
no. 3 (1995): 278. 
246 J. P. Rushton and C. D. Ankney, “Brain Size and Cognitive Ability: Correlations with Age, Sex, Social 
Class, and Race,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 3, no. 1 (1996): 33, doi:10.3758/BF03210739.  
247 Stephen A. Mitchell, “Psychodynamics, Homosexuality, and the Question of Pathology,” Studies in Gender 
and Sexuality 3, no. 1 (2002): 6, doi:10.1080/15240650309349186.  
248 Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis and Friedemann Pfäfflin, “The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity 
Disorder in Adolescents and Adults,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 39, no. 2 (2009): 500, doi:10.1007/s10508-
009-9562-y.  
249 Ivanka Savic, Alicia Garcia-Falgueras, and Dick F. Swaab, “Sexual Differentiation of the Human Brain 
in Relation to Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation,” Progress in Brain Research 106 (2010): 43, 
doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53630-3.00004-X.  
250 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1990), 43. 
 102 
need to naturalize their sexual or behavioral ‘perversions’. Additionally, the search for the 
‘gay brain’ or ‘gay gene’ is the most recent manifestation of a continued trend in the 
pathologizing of queer and trans people.251 Antiquated theories of homosexuality, such as 
sexual inversion, are present in the comparative analyses of gay and straight brains.252 
Gay male brains are correlated to feminization, while gay female brains to 
masculinization. These studies also extend the gendered stereotypes to the respective 
inverted sexual orientations. For trans people, the neuroscientific and medical bias is 
more apparent with diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) necessitating a 
validation of their identity.253  
The above mentioned social categories are easily recognizable identities that have 
been historically marginalized. However, considering the diagnostic tactics in modern day 
psychiatry, those who are labeled through diagnoses of behavioral and mental disorders 
may be a less visible group more directly affected by the diagnoses and therapeutic 
pressures associated with their ‘diseased’ state. Thus the implications of my proposal that 
neuroscience is susceptible to being a propagator of social marginalization can be tested 
by evaluating its effects on multiple identities.
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